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The role of identity and intercultural communication in European Regional Development and in the Integration Process

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**The Legitimacy
of New Regionalism
in the European
Integration Process**



FROM EXCLUSIVE BORDERS
TO INCLUSIVE FRONTIERS
IN THE **Western
Balkans**



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1. IDENTITY AT EUROPEAN, NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVEL - CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE¹

1.1. Concepts

Beyond the many facets of the identity, the one perspective of the identity cleavage in Central and Eastern Europe often appears to be very real and proven time and time again by more or less recent historical realities. Identity, be it that of an individual, of a group or of a community can generate both convergence and divergence in a rapport with the other. The other one, a true dichotomy, becomes the expression of the “one beyond” -- beyond what is specific to me, to my identity. A border, be it symbolic or ideological, can thus be identified around such identity constructions. The region of Central and Eastern Europe not only is no exception to this rule, but in our assertion it is the space that requires perhaps the most among all European states such identity frontiers.

Starting off from the general approach of the social sciences concerning the identity as being the description of features and the expression of the individuality of a person affiliated with a group or community, we find the existence of a construction both subjective and objective in relation to the common identity. This assertion involves aspects which are both universal and specific, introduced by the particular, often by the local-regional mentality constructions, so important in defining identity. Identity construction apparently placed on the same level of analysis can have different connotations.

Identity, irrespective of the level (European, national or regional/local), is reflected as a form of public expression despite the universalist trends, despite globalization or uniforming the values, the characteristics or the expressions of a community. Ethno-religious identity elements are found in the public global space and also in forms multiplied through the channels of propagation of the global. So not only the global multiply, but also the particular the specifics. The latter, often taking forms of extremism, nationalism, ethno-religious violence, are multiplied by gaining followers at thousands of kilometers away. Then the national and ethnic state associated to the national territory, has managed not only to survive the pressures of “global society”, but has demonstrated a greater affiliation capacity. The *identity globalization* has proven proved to be stronger in urban and industrialized societies; where there are consistent rural areas with rich cultural heritage and traditions a strong resistance to globalization has developed². Thus the local identity, the one at national-cultural level, is preserved stronger within rural-agrarian areas and within the areas of proximity to cultural reference sites. Such a fact does not preclude parallel development and strengthening of a supranational European identity. Conceptually, we witness this relation seemingly antagonistic:

¹ See for further details the chapter *Image of identity in Europe. Antagonism of interpretations* from Mircea Brie and Daniela Blaga, *Identity rematch in the European space* (2015), various references have been made to the contents of this study.

² Florin Poenaru, *Republica Moldova: complexul de superioritate al României*, <http://www.criticatac.ro/18342/republica-moldova-ca-sindrom/>, accesat în data de 26.06.2023



European identity versus national/local identity. A causal relationship, seen in both directions, can be observed regarding the deepening of European identity construction and in connection with economic development, social welfare, with confidence in the economy. The period of prosperity and economic growth at the beginning of the process of European integration *has strengthened the European identity and the feeling of European belonging*. In response, in the context of current economico-social and geopolitical crises we have been witnessing the „identity rematch” and „the feeling of returning to the historical, national and cultural identity”. The perspective can be catalogued as rigid and difficult to prove as long as both the European Union and the nation states are interested in the welfare and prosperity within the EU. But the discussion makes room for political and media elements. The theory of „scapegoating” quickly finds its applicability while *the other* is to blame for the decline in living standards, for the high unemployment (in these circumstances it may be the guilty EU, the guilty nation states, other peoples, immigrants, etc.). Or this is precisely here where we identify the potentially negative effect on the European identity building process³.

The equation of debates on European identity can be extended to analyze European interests versus national interests of countries that make up the union. Common interests can bring to the discussion table national states. The European construction, also in terms of identity, can benefit from the negotiations and compromises between states. When the discussion reaches issues related to the vital interests of the states everything⁴ can change, and the common edifice begins to falter. The effect can be both positive (in the sense that states are more conciliatory and cooperative when their primordial interests are threatened from outside). „National interests combine usually security with material concerns, on the one hand, and moral and ethical concerns, on the other hand”⁵. Beyond national or European interests, the question can open to national preferences or the EU’s preferences, as an international organization. Andrew Moravcsik makes reference to the three levels of analysis (internal / domestic, inter-state and supranational) and proposes a model regarding the impact of national preferences on economic realities⁶, which can be extended to a wider framework, that of the decision-making⁷.

Beyond the economic realities, we propose three levels of analysis in regard to the concept of identity: the European level, the national level and the regional level. A European citizen can be Italian, German or Romanian. At the same time an Italian citizen can be Sicilian,

³ Mircea Brie, Dana Blaga, *Identity rematch in the European space...*

⁴ For more details, see the typology of national interests done by Hans Morgenthau, who proposes to group them on vital interests (geered on the existence, security and survival of the state) and secondary interests (political, economic, cultural, social, human, ethno-religious or environmental). Hans Morgenthau, *Politica între națiuni. Lupta pentru putere și lupta pentru pace*, Iași. Polirom. 2007; Apud Petre Duțu, Cristina Bogzeanu, *Interesele naționale și folosirea instrumentelor de putere națională pentru promovarea și apărarea acestora. Cazul României*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2010, p. 8-13. Anastasia Cujba, Cristina Ejova, *Repere istoriografice și teoretico-conceptuale ale cercetării interesului național*, in *Studia Universitatis Moldaviae*, Revistă Științifică a Universității de Stat din Moldova, 2013, nr.3(63), p. 32-38.

⁵ S. Huntington, *The Erosion of American National Interests*, in *Foreign Affairs*, Published by: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997, vol.76, no.5, p. 28-49.

⁶ Andrew Moravcsik *Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach*, in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1993, vol. 31, issue 4, pp. 497-498.

⁷ For more details, see Ana Maria (Ghimiș) Costea, „*National Preferences of the EU and NATO Member States at the Eastern Border. Study Case: Romania and Poland*”, doctoral thesis, Babeș-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca, 2015.



Neapolitan, Venetian, Piedmontese, Tuscan etc. A German citizen can be a Bavarian, Saxon, Prussian or Austrian. Likewise, Transylvanians, Oltenians, Banat or Moldovans can together express the feeling of Romanian belonging.

The specialised literature captures the dispute over establishing the identity of a person or community. The process consists of two dimensions: self-identification and hetero-identification. In both cases, own identification and the identification done by someone else, the debate on the identity involves elements which are both objective and subjective. Unlike the concept of *national origin*, which refers to something given, inherited by birth, *national identity* is, above all, the expression of the awareness of belonging to a cultural community that is defined as a political community. This is the reality to which Ernest Renan refers when characterizing nation, suggestively, as a „daily plebiscite”⁸. National identity in this case is linked to the concept of nation, the latter understood as a population which shares a territory (to which it reports through the historical dimension), shared myths and historical memory, a mass culture, a common economy, and rights and legal liabilities common to each member (the latter making reference to the state political organization).

This analysis supposes the existence of: 1. a segment of population living on a certain territory; 2. a certain type of relation that expresses the awareness of identity and belonging, a real “community space”⁹. such a perspective on the nation is in agreement with the Westphalian state philosophy that places at the core the idea of a state-nation-territory.

Conceptually, the whole edifice identity comprises at least two specific elements from the time of its construction:

- National identity born of ethnicity
- National identity born of civic affiliation / citizenship

In the first case, the national identity serves a particular ethnic group often found in competition with other ethnic groups (most often present in the same space reference). The prospect gives rise to expressions of nationalist-tribal expressions that may involve exclusion of representatives of other ethnic groups.

In the second situation, the civic dimension serves the state, often leading to patriotism (a rather positive outlook if compared against the first situation when we are dealing with a negative connotation perspective!).

The analysis of the two dimensions lead some analysts to identify the major differences in the conceptual debate about the identity in Central and Eastern Europe versus the USA. The essential difference is that the European national identity answers the question of who is Romanian, Hungarian, Slovak etc. (so what makes us different from one another), while the American national identity seeks to identify those elements that are common to citizens (what makes citizens who are different in various situations in ethno-cultural contexts be Americans?)¹⁰. This conceptual dispute between national identity / European and American nation can be extrapolated to the European space as well. The idea of nationality is perceived

⁸ Apud Gábor Flóra, *Identitate și ideologie națională: o perspectivă socio-istorică*, in Balogh Brigitta, Bernáth Krisztina, Bujalos István, Adrian Hatos, Murányi István (coord.), *Identitate europeană, națională și regional. Teorie și practică*, Editura Partium, Oradea, 2011, p. 114.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 115

¹⁰ István Bujalos, *Identitatea personală și națională în filosofia americană*, în Balogh Brigitta, Bernáth Krisztina, Bujalos István, Adrian Hatos, Murányi István (coord.), *Identitate europeană, națională și regional. Teorie și practică*, Editura Partium, Oradea, 2011, p. 79-91.



differently in the Western Europe and Central Eastern Europe. In most Western countries the national identity has been built mainly around the idea of citizenship, and the state territory of the term has become therefore the fundamental reference for “national territory” - the *civic dimension of national identity*. Eastern Europe took a different path of development, in which *ethnicity* has had a fundamental role in building the national identity - the *ethnic dimension of national identity*¹¹. Thus, the western model of nation stresses the centrality of national territory or homeland of the nation, while the Eastern model is concerned with ethnicity and cultural ties. A fundamental characteristic of state construction of the Eastern European type is permanent lack of *legitimacy* or rather, their incomplete legitimacy. By identifying the state with a single national identity, other national communities inevitably found themselves outside this process of legitimization, which was a *fundamental source of inter-ethnic tension*. This reality has led to the sacralisation of the state territory considered *national territory*¹² (property of the one nation / nationalities!) and the cultural-historical philosophy is to un-legitimize as much as possible the contribution of other national community¹³. Reported to the European level of analysis on the concept of European identity, the legitimate question is whether we are talking about a common European identity or, in contrast, about the presence of identity borders in Europe. Some identity cleavage can be observed between western and eastern Europe. This reality is given by the historical, cultural, religious and political heritage.

The borders of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) today are the result of a complex process carried out in recent decades after the fall of communist regimes in this part of Europe. During the Cold War, Europe was divided in two by the two military blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Pact). The line between the two military blocs emerged as a *hard border, closed*, called the Iron Curtain. Subsequently, the enlargement of the EU and NATO's eastward through the integration of most former communist states in this part of Europe, led to the disappearance of this *barrier* that separated Europeans from Europeans. This process did not remove the distinct identity of the West against the East¹⁴. Moreover, in our opinion, the last decades of the communist period and the post-communist transition exposed a separate identity of Central Europe compared to western and eastern European continent¹⁵. The possible identity cleavage in the European space can be extended to an analysis such as north versus south. The current context of financial crisis, the sovereign debt crises, exposed to the media and public opinion, a European North more rigorous and more attentive with their money, more interested in accumulating, more protestant if we are to refer to the Weberian theory¹⁶, and an European South more spendthrift, indebted, more wasteful, more catholic and orthodox (in its east part - with direct reference to the Greek state to state that has been in the public attention in recent years)¹⁷.

¹¹ Gábor Flóra, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 118-128.

¹³ Mircea Brie, Dana Blaga, *Identity rematch in the European space...*

¹⁴ Mircea Brie, *European enlargement and new frontiers Central and Eastern Europe*, in *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Series Europaea, Cluj-Napoca*, LIX, 1, 2014, p. 113-130.

¹⁵ For more details on this topic we recommend consulting the doctoral thesis signed by Alexandra Tieanu, *Europa Centrală, 1989-2004: perspective culturale și geopolitice*, Cluj-Napoca, 2012.

¹⁶ See the main theses of Max Weber from his famous work *Etica Protestantă și spiritul capitalismului*, published in Germania in 1904.

¹⁷ Mircea Brie, Dana Blaga, *Identity rematch in the European space...*



Without claiming to exhaust all conceptual disputes regarding the European identity, the regional-European or national identity, we conclude by referring to the diversity recorded in Europe, and to the distinct manner, sometimes antagonistic, in which the European identity has evolved as a east-west or north-south dichotomy, with particular emphasis in Central Europe. This space, in relation to identity, acquires specific meanings given its location between Catholic Europe, Protestant Europe and Orthodox Europe; between Germanic, Latin and Slavic Europe.

1.2. Identity Revolution: Historical Perspective. A Cause of the European Concert's Crash¹⁸

The nineteenth century was a century of great monarchies, largely allied around the idea of preserving a conservative system. From the perspective of international relations, the Vienna Congress (1815) inaugurates a form of relationship between states based on the concept of collective security. The system of congresses that followed that of Vienna will guarantee peace in Europe until the First World War. This new model of conceiving relations between states was called the European Concert¹⁹. The Austrian Chancellor Metternich, who marked his first half of the nineteenth century through his personality and thought, thought that the balance alone could be achieved only in a conservative Europe, hence his anti-liberalism. He believed in the existence of general interests over particular interests of the states and also in the need of the "European Concert". In this sense, he wrote: *"Since there can no longer be an isolated state, which must defend itself in the annals of a barbarian world (...), we must always consider the "society" of states as an essential condition of the modern world (...); over these general interests can be relied on the guarantee of its existence. Establishing international relations on the basis of reciprocity and with the guarantee of respect for just acquisitions is in our time the political essence"*²⁰.

At the same time, European societies are modernizing, and under the impact of modernization, profound changes take place both at the national level and at the international level.

Liberalism is becoming stronger and more prevalent at European level in the first half of the nineteenth century. It promoted tolerance, dialogue, pluralism, private initiative in the economy, reducing state intervention in all sectors of society, constitutional political regime, respecting the principle of the separation of powers in the state, observance of collective and individual fundamental freedoms. At the same time conservatism gains other dimensions,

¹⁸ This text was developed and revised based on the study Mircea Brie, *Identity Revolution and Minority Emancipation: A Cause of the European Concert's Crash. Contemporary Analogues*, în Ioan Horga, Alina Stoica (coordonatori), *Europe a Century after the End of the First World War (1918-2018)*, București, Editura Academiei Române, 2018, p. 245-248.

¹⁹ Apud Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, *Relațiile internaționale de la echilibru la sfârșitul concertului european (secolul XVII – începutul secolului XX)*, Ediția a II-a, revizuită și adăugită, (Oradea, Editura Universității din Oradea, 2009), 227; Mircea Brie, *Diplomacy and International Relations in Europe (17th –18th centuries)*. (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2014). Pierre Renouvain, Jean Baptiste Duroselle, *Introduction à l'histoire des relations internationales*, ed. IV (Paris, 1991); Juan Carlos Pereira, *Historia de las relaciones internacionales contemporaneas*, (Barcelona, 2003).

²⁰ Serge Berstein, Pierre Milza, *Istoria Europei*, vol. 4, (Iași, 1999), 14-16.



developing in opposition to liberalism. Tradition, morality, order, hierarchy were principles thought to be essential to the development of society at all levels.

Under the effect of revolutionary transformations, propelled by themselves by the revolutions that have taken place all over Europe, social-political and ethno-national systems have a new dimension. The efficacy of the new leads to the erosion of the old monarchic order of powerful governments. One of the most visible transformations involves national and identity empowerment. The peoples develop a growing national conscience, culminating in the principle of self-determination of the peoples, so much put into the scene of the treaties that regulated the order after the First World War.

a. National revolutions and unification of national states

The 19th century also experienced the period of several large multinational states (e.g. the Tsarist Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, etc.), but also the beginning of the fragmentation and development of the national states that emerged amid the emancipation of identity. Many European states gain independence (e.g. Greece, Belgium, Serbia, Romania, etc.), others unify their national territories (e.g. Italy, Germany, Romania, etc.). The effervescence of national movements in 19th century Europe was given by the strengthening of national consciousness to more and more peoples. This phenomenon is amplified after the revolutionary year 1848, when the evolution of national consciousness combines liberal and romantic nationalist elements especially with the peoples of central and southeast Europe (Romanians, Serbs, Hungarians, Poles, Czechs, Croats, Bulgarians or Greeks). In their nationalist claims, the historical heritage of medieval leaders and states is considered to be the ideal model: Michael the Brave the Romanian unificator (to the Romanians the appeal is made to Dacia's unified antique state as a reference space that unites all of them Romanians), the Serbian state of Stefan Dusan, the Hungarian Kingdom of St. Stephen, the Polish-Lithuanian Union, the state of the Great Moravia, Croatia of Tomislav, the country of Krum and Simeon, the Byzantine Empire, and so on.

The 19th century was called the "century of nationalities", since this century has been a strong affirmation of national identity, national ideologies, and national movements for the realization of the ideals of nations. Napoleonic wars have contributed to this effervescence of the national spirit. The national is often replenished in this process of religious emancipation.

In the Balkans, for example, the peoples develop their national spirit through the common struggle of the Orthodox Christian peoples against the Ottoman (Islamic) or Austro-Hungarian (Catholic-Protestant) external oppression. Such associations are also given by the geopolitical context of the expansion of Russian influence in this space. The Pan-Orthodox discourse thus stimulates the common struggle and the national ideal of these peoples. This rhetoric is extremely favorable to this process precisely because of a particularity of Orthodoxy: the national church. The nationalist, nationalist rhetoric even of the Orthodox religious leaders of these Balkan peoples transforms the Orthodox national churches into germs of national emancipation and unification. Such a form acquires the national liberation movement of the Greeks of 1821 in which other Balkan peoples took part.

In the West, national emancipation is stimulated by economic and social transformations, by the anti-aristocratic bourgeois revolution. By implication, this movement takes on a form of blame and condemnation of the conservative system of domineering monarchies. The coalition movement in Italy, the bourgeois and national revolution in Belgium

(culminating in the proclamation of independence in October 1830), the spread and consolidation of the bourgeois-national secret societies in Spain, France and Germany, lead to the destabilization of a supranational conservative order. The whole system is under discussion.

National aspirations played a special role in the Habsburg Empire during the 1848 Revolutions. The peoples had consolidated in national consciousness. They now claim their right to separate in national states (see, for example, the case of the Hungarians or the Czechs). In 1848, there were then movements of unification in a national state of separate state units (Germany), either mixed, of skill under foreign domination and reunification (Italy, Romania).

The outcome of the European Revolutions of 1848 implied a brake on the destinies of nationalist movements that emerged in Europe in the early part of the nineteenth century. However, the counterrevolution of 1848-1849 did not put an end to the processes that have affected the European balance in the years to come. In this imbalance relations between the various European states will be greatly influenced by the interest of the various national movements between 1849 and 1871 to create their own nations and the increasing rivalry between the main powers due to the economic transformations of the second process industrial revolutions. The combination of these factors has occurred in a series of successive international crises that have prompted a profound transformation of the European scenario.

The success of the German, Italian and Romanian national movements implied the emergence of new international actors and the redefinition of the bases that determined the foreign policy of the European powers. Romania, as a national project of the Romanians, following a complex process that takes shape with the unification of the Romanian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (1859), for two decades later to proclaim its independence from the Ottoman suzerainty (1877). This act was consecrated by the Congress of Berlin (1878) which regulated the new geopolitical context in South-Eastern Europe after the war against the Ottomans in which the Romanian army fought along side the Russian one.

**Map 1. Union of the Romanian Principalities of Moldova and Wallachia.
Romania 1859-1878**




Source: Ioan Petrescu, Desăvârșirea Unirii Principatelor Române,
http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/desavarsirea-unirii-principatelor-romane-1_58863d195ab6550cb8ba2ec9/index.html, accessed on 11.05.2023

The unification of Italy took place in several stages and means including the war. The Piedmont Free State took the initiative because King Victor Emanuel II (1849-1878) enjoyed



the support of Italian nationalists. But her artisan was Camillo Cavour, becoming prime minister since 1852. The first stage was the Piedmont war supported by France against Austria for the liberation of northern Italy. It followed the joining of the south of Italy to the Kingdom and the creation of the New Italian State that brought together most of the Italian territories proclaimed King of Italy Victor Emanuel II (1861). They remained outside the Italian state of Venice, held by the Habsburgs and the Papal State defended by the French. In 1866, when the war broke out between Prussia and Austria, Italy joined Prussia. Italy gets Venice, the unification of Italy ends in 1870 when the French troops withdraw from Rome which is proclaimed the capital of the Italian state.

Map 2. The stages of the unification of Italy




Source: taken from <http://sardegnamondo.eu/2014/12/16/italia-e-sardegna-nuovo-centralismo-e-soluzioni-cervellotiche/>, accessed in 11.05.2023

Germany, economically prepared by the *Zollherein* customs union, united in three wounds that Prussian Chancellor Bismark provokes. The first in 1864 against Denmark, the German ducats Schleswig and Hollstein. Prussia, allied with Austria, declares war on Denmark, which it defeats. Denmark gives up the dukes that are divided between Prussia and Austria. In 1866 the conflict between Prussia and Austria breaks out of which Prussia is victorious in the Battle of Sadowa. By the Treaty of Prague in August 1866, Austria was excluded from the German Confederation. Prussia sets up the foundations of the Northern German Confederation. The Confederation does not include the southern states that were supported by France. The unification of Germany ends with the war between Prussia and France in 1870-1871. The French army suffers a humiliating defeat and captures the Sedan. The southern German states enter the Confederation. This moment marks the end of the unification process of Germany. On January 18, 1871, King Prussia Wilhelm I was proclaimed Emperor of Germany.



Map 3. Unification of Germany around Prussia



Source: taken from <https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/napoleon-si-identitatea-germana-imparatul-pune-bazele-infrangerii-frantei>, accessed in 11.05.2023

Italy and Germany unify in the wake of a series of lawsuits that involved the break-up of regional resistance through armed struggle. Beyond any other assumptions, 1870 marks profound changes on the European scene. The two united national states are the system of great powers within which control and order are withdrawn.

At the same time, the pressure of the national emancipation movements within the Habsburg Empire is dissipated for a short period by laying the foundations of the Austro-Hungarian dualism of 1867. The dualistic pact between Austria and Hungary was signed on February 5, 1867. Following this act, the birth of Austro-Hungary, also called the Royal and Royal Double Monarchy, a state led by the Habsburg monarchs between 1867 and 1918. The day of June 8, 1867, when Emperor Franz Joseph I was crowned King of Hungary, is actually the date of the cessation of Austrian absolutism and the beginning of Austro-Hungarian dualism, recognized in Austria by constitution as of December 21, 1867, and remained in force until 31 October 1918 (when Hungary left the union). The Austro-Hungarian dualist monarchy created in 1867 was run by the Emperor of Austria, who at the same time had the status of King of Hungary.


Map 4. The ethnic structure of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1910



Source: Apud <http://www.unitischimbam.ro/compromisul-austro-ungar-din-1867/>, accessed in 11.05.2023

This dualist act was a compromise made by the Hungarians in Austria at the expense of other peoples within the monarchy: Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Italians, Romanians, Slovenes, Croats or Serbs. The consolidation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the strengthening of the two nations led to a pressure of denationalization of the other peoples. This process has resulted in an effervescence of national movements, an identity revolution in all corners of the Monarchy. Its end was predictable in the absence of a project that would encompass the others. Romanian Aurel Popovici proposes the federation of the Monarchy, through the establishment of 15 autonomous provinces (states) established on the principle of nationality, respecting the ethical borders and enjoying a wide internal autonomy, according to the Swiss or American model.

Map 5. The United States of Greater Austria (proposed by Aurel Popovici, 1906)



Source: Apud *Politeia World*, <http://politeia.org.ro/magazin-istoric/aurel-popovici-si-statele-unite-ale-austriei-mari/14708/>, accessed in 11.05.2023

b. Eroding the old monarchic order of powerful governments. The collapse of multinational empires

In an analysis of the map of Europe in the middle of the second half of the nineteenth century, it was noted that in mainland Europe there were some great empires and big kingdoms. If we exclude Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, which at that time had not yet gained their independence from Ottoman suzerainty, few states remain in the category of small European states.

Map 6. Europe of 1871



Source: Cristian Vornicu, Magda Stan, *Istoria de nota 10*, Editura Cd Press, 2010, București, p. 16-17.

Map 7. Contemporary Europe



Source: <https://lizardpoint.com/geography/europe-quiz.php>, accessed in 11.05.2023



Towards the end of the nineteenth century all nations were highlighted by forceful positions. National, nation and national territory defense are identified as an inevitable objective. The nation (in other cases the race) was conceived as a supreme good, deserving all the sacrifice. The patriotic vision of national unity is so exalted as transcendent; accompanying the model of heroic virtues (discipline, solidarity of social classes, etc.). And so, the patriotic ideal converged, ultimately, to the unconditional defense of the nation. In this way, the defense of the nation was conceived as the defense of order, and groups were determined in this direction as leaders of the same national ideal. All of this is specific not only to the consolidated nations that had their own states but also to those affirmed which, many, were still under the domination of multinational states. On the other hand, this national effervescence is accompanied by the attempts of the great empires to extend their territories and influence. This is the case with the expansionary tendencies of Tsarist Russia or Austro-Hungary towards the increasingly difficult to control the Ottoman Empire's Turks.

At the beginning of the twentieth century in central and south-eastern Europe, many nations were still on the borders of multinational empires: Austro-Hungarian, Russian, German, and Ottoman. Others, although they had been constituted in national states, had not perfected their national unity to which they aspired.

During the period between the Crimean War and the First World War, we see a tendency to re-establish the Order between States in the European Space. After the Paris Congress, France is positioned in the state conducting the European scene, and national emancipation is even more used to undermine the Central-Eastern empires. It was the stage where the unifying nationalism of Romanians, Germans and Italians benefited, at least up to one point, from French support. The Habsburg Empire, becoming Austro-Hungarian since 1867, the Tsarist and the Ottoman Empire seem to be the main losers in this process. The reality, however, also confirms a redesign of the Order: Germany is positioned after 1871 in the dominant state of the international system, a process imposed with the defeat and isolation of France.

Europe experiences in these two types of nationalism: nationalism of power and nationalism of existence. Some states and nations are therefore experiencing expansive, forceful, and other survival, defensive, and existential nationalisms²¹. Promoting the nation and the principle of nationalities seems to serve both the expansion of the empire or new state power and the survival of the old structures. In fact, this process, stimulated by the rivalry of the great powers that undermined the support of national movements, contributed to the undermining of the pre-World War I system and order

The new Balkan states (Greece, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria), for example, in an attempt to correspond to the existential form of the modern state, have developed forms of national existence that have often led to a real "clash of civilization"²². For these states, "the second half of the nineteenth century meant a process of constructing membership, at least theoretically, to Western European civilization. The Balkans, dominated for a long time by the

²¹ René Girault, *Peuples et nations d'Europe au XX-ème siècle*, (Paris, 1996), 143-203.

²² This theory is promoted by Samuel Huntington about the realist concept of power and security by recognizing the importance of culture in relation to political identity and redefining the world system of international relations. Just as after 1945, in Europe after the Congress of Paris (1856) we find a similar process. Samuel Huntington, *Clădirea civilizațiilor și refacerea ordinii mondiale*, traducere de Radu Carp, (Editura Antet București, 1998), 54-55.



Ottomans, tried to create a new socio-political and ethnic configuration, especially since there were many ethnic communities in this geographic area”²³.

In 1912, the first Balkan war between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria took place (the latter proclaiming its independence in 1908) and the Ottoman Empire on the other, for the liberation from Ottoman domination of all Balkan territories. The misunderstandings of their division lead to the outbreak of a new war in 1913 between Bulgaria and the former allies of Greece and Serbia, which will also involve Romania. The 1913 Peace in Bucharest put an end to the conflict by redeploying the territories that were liberated.

In the Balkans the balance remains precarious. Albania emerged as a sovereign state, but not Macedonia. The Austro-Hungarian game was paying more expensive, the German influence in Turkey grew. Russian ambitions were unsatisfied. Serbia claims for it the land of all Western Balkan Slavs, including parts of Greece such as the port of Thessaloniki. The Ottoman legacy in the Balkan space is far from being able to be settled, and the Eastern Question follows its course.

Nationalism is used by most European states to mobilize people to support domestic and foreign policies. The second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, “Europeans were apologizing for violence, convinced of the need for superior nations to dominate their lower peoples”²⁴. These attitudes have been promoted by the imperial states, but have also contributed to promoting the emancipation of some of the nations. Extreme nationalism, therefore, appears to be one of the main causes that led to the First World War²⁵. This major conflict marked the next stage in the formation of European national states. Thus, multinational empires that were part of the *European Concert* collapsed when the impact of national emancipation staged by the principle of national self-determination.

The Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination was one of the 14 points of the program proposed by US President Thomas Woodrow Wilson at the Peace Conference in Paris (1919-1920). The implementation of this principle in Paris allowed for the establishment of new national states following the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Tsarist Empire, and the separation of territories from the German Empire. Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland are formed. Southern Slavs from the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy joined with Serbia in the Serbo-Croat-Slovenian kingdom, which had been named Yugoslavia since 1929. Romania views its acknowledged act of the Union of the United States in the year 1918 achieved by the unification of Transylvania, Bucovina and Bessarabia with the Old Kingdom.

²³ Enache Tuşa, „Etnia și națiunea în filosofia politică a statelor balcanice și est-europene – 1880-1940”, in *Sfera Politicii*, nr. 180-181, 2014, p. 195.

²⁴ John R. Barber, *Istoria Europei Moderne*, (București, Editura Lider, 1993), 322.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

Map 8. Interwar Europe



Source: *Omniatlas*, available at <http://omniatlas.com/maps/europe/19201112/>, accessed in 17.05.2023

1.3. Contemporary Europe. A new stage of ethno-national emancipation: identity rematch (retaliation)²⁶

In the contemporary period, we witness the effervescence of the nation, despite the progress made at European level in strengthening European identity. The process of European construction was accompanied by a certain diminishing of the national, at least at the level of expression of the nationalist-extremist movements. European identity appears as a higher-ranking identity that reduces the forms of expression of national and regional identities. That's at least in theory. On the other hand, in the current context, we are entitled to believe that European identity has taken on a form of manifestation parallel to national or regional levels, without being very close to them. That is, reducing or amplifying manifestations at a certain level does not lead to a counterweight to another level.

Diachronic, stimulated by the phenomenon of globalization, the success of the EU, especially the European enlargement to the east and the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, the European identity has been exalted both at the level of public discourse and at the everyday level. The phenomenon, in our opinion, also knows another facet: the actual rebellion of the present period. As a result of systemic crises at EU level (economic, financial, social, institutional or legitimacy), new geopolitical realities in the proximity (e.g. the situation in Ukraine, the Near East, North Africa), but also as a result of migration massive, we find a return to local, regional or national identities²⁷.

Without proposing on this occasion to analyze the political realities and the political leaders' discourse, in the European space, but not only, we are witnessing, at this stage, more than at other stages of the history of the last hundred years, a radicalization of the speech with a national accent. Political movements get more and more national, ethno-cultural nuances and identity. Not only populism gains ground, but also the xenophobic, tribal debate, the fear and the danger depicted in the image of the other.

²⁶ This text was developed and revised based on the study Mircea Brie, Daniela Blaga, "Identity rematch in the European space", in Alina Stoica, Ioan Horga, Mircea Brie, *Cultural Diplomacy at the Eastern and Western Borders of the European Union*, (Oradea, Editura Universității din Oradea, 2015).

²⁷ *Ibidem*



The European Union, Russia, globalization, the immigrant, the multinationals, the national minorities, but also those who are not part of the nationalized community, are real scapegoats that the political leaders in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, use to generate excitement and capitalize on the increasingly nationalist expressions in these countries²⁸.

The countries of the Visegrád Group, another example for all of the pro-European orientation, 10 years after their accession to the European Union, began to develop strong Eurosceptic attitudes accompanied by nationalist speeches. The national revenge seems to be favored by the impossibility of Brussels to bring captive citizens closer to the national level. The failure of some turns into the success of others who come to rescue the siege. In Poland, nationalism, more romantic nationalism, began to gain ground in October 2015, when Jaroslaw Kaczynski's Party of Law and Justice (PiS) came to power. Viktor Orbán, Hungarian Prime Minister, has strengthened his position at the domestic political level by promoting strident nationalist and arrogant speeches against everything that is foreign, irritating even the closest allies²⁹. His Fidesz party led Hungary to a nationalist and populist illiberalism³⁰.

Nationalism is on the rise in the European states. It takes various forms, such as the pro-independence movements in Catalonia and Scotland, or, more often, the populist and right-wing reactionary doctrines. Extreme-right or national-conservative populist formations are represented in the executives of several EU member states, namely in Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Austria, and more recently in Italy.

This picture is complemented by the nationalist rhetoric of political leaders such as Vladimir Putin in Russia or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey. In both cases, rhetoric often refers to the glorious imperialist past of its own history that it would like to revive, even in the minds of its own citizens, which mobilizes to support such projects in relation to internal and external enemies.

Beyond all this, many European states must find solutions to the increasingly extreme claims of national minorities.

In the current context of the crisis, cooperation and dialogue have often left room for suspicion and competition. States are repositioned on national criteria in relation to the economic issues they have. Many political leaders have built their public discourse on the culprit of other European partners, and hence the radicalization observed in public opinion. The *theory of small states* of the Austrian Leopold Kohr³¹ is back in fashion. Thinking on an economic foundation, this theory is gaining more and more supporters from the point of view of the political and national functionality of the states. "The solution to global problems is no more unity and growth, but more division; the world needs to be fragmented in several small states, whose economies will be more flexible"³². Starting from this theory, there have been

²⁸ See Mircea Brie and Daniela Blaga, "The Theory of Differentiated Integration Put into Practice - From the Western Balkans to the Eastern Partnership, in *Studii Europene*, nr. 5. (Chisinau: 2015), 219-237.

²⁹ Nicolae Filipescu, Nationalismul lui Viktor Orbán, disponibil online <https://revista22.ro/68/.html>, accessed 23.06.2023.

³⁰ Andrei Manolescu, *Ungaria lui Orbán*, <http://dilemaveche.ro/sectiune/tilc-show/articol/ungaria-lui-orban>, accessed 23.06.2023.

³¹ In 1957, Kohr published the work *The Fall of Nations*, claiming that small states, small nations and small economies are more peaceful, more prosperous, and more creative than massive states and superpowers.

³² Dorian Furtună, *Teoria statelor mici și „socul identităților”*, http://adevarul.ro/international/europa/teoria-statelor-mici-socul-identitatilor-1_54cbaa85448e03c0fd1d9624/index.html, accessed 29.06.2023



many geopolitical maps that attempt to ground the idea of the functionality of smaller states in the European space.

Here are just three of these map projects. One of them proposes the fragmentation of European countries into 73 autonomous or independent ethno-cultural regions, which should reflect so many ethnic or cultural entities (there are serious reservations, however, in terms of identity for many of these regions)³³.

Map 9. Project of “Europe of Regions”³⁴



Source: Dorian Furtună, *Teoria statelor mici...*

Another map that is part of the same logic is promoted by Freddy Heineken. Based on Leopold Kohr's theory, it proposes a fragmentation of European countries in dozens of small states (through regionalization), with a population of 5-10 million. His project – the United States of Europe – is similar to the successful model of the United States of America. In his vision monoethnic states are more functional.

³³ *Ibidem*

³⁴ Harta a fost elaborată în baza materialelor Mesei Rotunde a Ligii Jurnalismului Conservator cu genericul „Regiunile unite ale Europei: Kosovo ca înaintaş în procesul de glocalizare europeană”.

Map 10. Project-map for the United States of Europe, as envisaged by Freddy Heineken, Inspired from Leopold Kohr's theses



Source: Jordi Francesch, *Eurotopia with beer*³⁵

At the level of the current period in Europe, there are numerous ethno-national claims that involve autonomous demands or even territorial segregation through independence. If all these moves were successful then Map Europe would show, according to Mauldin Economics, like this:

Map 11. Europe of secessionist movements



Source: Mauldin Economics, Geopolitical Futures Zero Hedge via Bank of America Merrill Lynch. Apud Business Insider, <http://uk.businessinsider.com/map-of-european-independence-movements-2017-6>, accessed in 23.06.2023

The association of nation-state-territory-border carries some nuances. Even if the nation states remain very strong, the current geopolitical context, we can say that the era of national

³⁵ <https://mappingworld.wordpress.com/2012/06/26/eurotopia-amb-cervesa/>, accessed 29.06.2023



states, as known to date is redefined, realigning themselves in a more complex logic. Principles like extraterritoriality and even non-territoriality become topics discussed in some circles about the national and international state logic. Increasingly, „borders” occur within states between communities. Non-integrated immigrants (unwanted by the majority!) are more numerous, discrimination and marginalization forcing them to isolate and to react sometimes as „existential forms” parallel to the state they live in³⁶. More media attention received the granting of dual citizenship to the Romanians in Moldova and to the ethnic Hungarians in countries around Hungary (with special emphasis on disputes pro and against Slovakia and Romania, where Hungarian communities are more numerous). The topic has become particularly important due to the fact that even if dual citizenship was granted to an individual, given the magnitude, it carried the message that it was granted to the mass of a group, of a community. Hence hope in some cases, or fear in other cases that “Small Hungary” might be created in southern Slovakia or central Romania³⁷.

Collectively, in Europe there is an increase in the identity claims; there is risk for more states to soon face a territorial ethno-separatism. The Kosovo precedent has given impetus to many ethnic communities from Europe (including the European Union). „The fashion of secessionist referendum method will disturb the perspective of Europe in the coming years in Scotland and Catalonia to Ukraine or Moldova”, remarked Valentin Naumescu in an analysis made on the Crimean referendum³⁸. The case of the Crimean referendum, imported in / exported to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and also to Transnistria and Gagauzia keeps Eastern Europe and the eastern borders of the EU under tension, bringing to the fore the exercise of power by the new Russian imperialism³⁹.

Whether it is internal or external causes, that the case is political, institutional-administrative, socio-economic or cultural-religious, the European identity has weakened during the crisis after 2008 in relation to the national or regional-local identity. We reached this conclusion by reference to the attachment that the European citizens feel towards the European Union in relation to their own states or settlements where they live. Methodologically, we studied the information that we have available from the Eurobarometer. We picked for review

³⁶Mircea Brie, „Minoritățile naționale: niveluri de analiză educațională”, in Vasile Cucerescu, Enrique Banus, Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Ioan Horga (coord.), *Ghidul Uniunii Europene în școală între educația formală și neformală*, (Chișinău, 2014), 52-71.

³⁷Mircea Brie, Polgar Istvan, „Dual Citizenship Granted to Hungarian Ethnicns. Context and Arguments in the Romanian and Hungarian Mass Media”, in Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Sorin Șipoș, *Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union's East Border*, (Oradea/Debrecen, Editura Universității din Oradea/Editura Universității din Debrecen, supliment *Eurotimes*, 2011), 151-162; Mircea Brie, „A New European Neighbourhood Policy toward Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova in the Context of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the Association Agreements (AA)”, in *Studii Europene*, nr. 10. (Chisinau: 2017), 123-155.


³⁸Valentin Naumescu, *Întoarcerea revizionismului în Europa. Metoda referendumului*, <http://www.contributors.ro/global-europa/intoarcerea-revizionismului-in-europa-metoda-referendumului/>, accessed on 23.06.2023.

³⁹See Mircea Brie, „Rethinking the European Neighborhood Policy. Eastern Partnership”, in *Analele Universității din Oradea, Seria Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene*. (Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, 2017), 55-71; Mircea Brie, „The Cross-Border Cooperation Between Romania and Ukraine in the Context of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and Association Agreements (AA)”, in *EUROPOLITY, Continuity and Change in European Governance*, Vol. 11, no. 2, (București: 2017), 51-78.



two years, 2007 and 2014 respectively, to see if the crisis significantly influenced the Europeans' options (See for this comparative analysis Brie and Blaga, 2015).

Map 12. Attachment to the European Union (2007)



Source: Eurobarometer 67. Public opinion in the European Union, April - May 2007, p. 85⁴⁰

If in 2007 the average commitment of European citizens towards the EU was 53%, in 2014 it dropped to 45%. With few exceptions (including Poland and Romania - two countries in the East, one in which there has not been economic recession during the crisis and another, Romania, where its citizens have got to have more confidence in Brussels to tackle corruption and poverty only its own state institutions), in European countries the proportion of those who feel attached to the EU declined. It is interesting to note, however, how this decline has occurred in some states. In 2007 we have a high level of adherence to the EU for citizens of countries like Italy, Spain, Belgium, Hungary and Poland. By 2014, the citizens of this state attachment evolved very differently. Poland is the only country where the EU attachment is on the increase slope. Hungary and Belgium are two states which show similarities because although knowing a significant decline in the level of attachment to the EU, they do not seem to be cases concerned to transfer that attachment to their countries or places of residence (see comparative fig. 4-6). Of these five countries, Spain and Italy constitute a special group. In these countries, which have benefited greatly from membership of the European Union, there is a very strong local and regional identity, but also with significant immigrant communities. The drop in devotion to the EU is very steep in Italy (from 62% - 2007 39% - 2014) and Spain (from 62% - 2007 46% - 2014). In these countries, hit hard by the recession, with serious problems of over-indebtedness, where large communities of immigrants accept jobs poorly paid, with high levels of unemployment among natives, attachment citizens are not transferred even to own countries (the attachment in one's country is among the lowest in the EU) but in places of residence, at


⁴⁰http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_en.pdf, p. 85, accessed on 23.06.2023



local or regional level. The strong local or regional identity captures the citizens' attachment to these countries (see Fig. 6).

By comparing the two times (2007 and 2014) we found that the attachment to the European Union moves to two categories of states: states in a geographically central axis and to Eastern states. This group of states includes France, Belgium and Germany (central states in the process of European construction), to which, in the same central axis, we would place also Poland, accompanied from the eastern axis by Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and the Baltic States. The logic compels us to accept that in crisis situations, countries such as Germany, France and Belgium and their citizens understand the meaning, role and importance of the European Union. In this equation of confidence in the Union we can place the newly entered EU member states from the east. We wonder, is this the same in the case of identity? The essence and the future support of Europe lies in the New Europe?

Map 13. Attachment to the European Union (2014)




Source: Eurobarometer 82. European Citizenship, Autumn 2014, p. 10⁴¹

By comparison with the attachment to the European Union, the attachment to their own country reveals a different behavior of citizens of European states. Note that this attachment is high in all European countries, the EU average being 91% in 2014. In the group of countries with a higher share of the population who feel attached to their country except for Austria, the other countries are geographically positioned at the EU's periphery, in the west, north, south and east. We note the geographical distribution of these countries compared to the somewhat compact middle position of countries where the population feels attached to the European Union (2014).

⁴¹http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_citizen_en.pdf, p. 10, accessed on 23.06.2023



Map 14. Attachment to own country (2014)




Source: Eurobarometer 82. European Citizenship, Autumn 2014, p. 7⁴²

A strong attachment to home settlements, to local or regional area, is obvious in the countries of southern and eastern flanks. Together with Portugal, Poland, Austria, Slovakia and Greece, whose populations are proving to be very attached to their country, the group of countries with the population attached to the local factor lie countries like Italy, Bulgaria and Romania. These latter countries are found to be related to the local community also because of the failure of national policy.

⁴²*Ibidem*, p. 7



Map 15. Attachment to home settlement (2014)



Source: Eurobarometer 82. European Citizenship, Autumn 2014, p. 6⁴³

Without claiming to answer all questions arising from this very complex subject, we find that the national emancipation of the peoples and the identity revolutions of the 19th and 20th centuries have been able to shake up the existing order in the European space. Similar to the period of the second half of the nineteenth century, the last decades have led to the introduction of a significant number of European states on the European Map. This process does not seem to have come to an end, and in the context of a failure of European public policies, the so-called European identity globalization is increasingly challenged at the national level. Identity revenge is manifested both by returning to national and regional levels, to identities that can later challenge the national level as well.

The resurgence of the world order following the election of US President Donald Trump comes to support our theory even further. The new customs duties⁴⁴, announced by and against the Americans, have the effect of, among other things, national protectionism and identity. It was precisely these (national economic and identity protectionism) that positioned themselves among the main causes of the tension of the international system before the First World War.

1.4. Identity realities on the eastern border of the European Union⁴⁵

Positioned in the eastern part of the EU, the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe have faced problems arising more often from the presence of a wide variety of

⁴³*Ibidem*, p. 6

⁴⁴ The introduction of 25% customs duty on steel imports and 10% on aluminum imports by the United States produced a worldwide dissatisfaction this month (June 2018). Many states and organizations have already announced the introduction of customs duties for various imported products from the US.

⁴⁵ This text was developed and revised based on the study Mircea Brie, *Identity as Frontier in Central and Eastern Europe. The Case of the Republic of Moldova*, in Mircea Brie, Alina Stoica, Florentina Chirodea (coord.), *The European Space Borders and Issues. In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga*, Editura Universității din Oradea/Debrecen University Press, Oradea/Debrecen, 2016, p. 359-381.



ethno-confessional diversity on their own territory. This structure of the population, with numerous and consistent minority communities, has been the center of debate regarding not only the socio-economic balanced climate, but also the societal or even existential security of these countries. Most often minorities are seen as factors of instability and less as integrators.

Ethnic and cultural boundaries do not overlap with those of the states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). We identify symbolic “frontiers” of the identity type that separate more or less human communities on ethnic or cultural criteria.

The Euro-Atlantic integration of these countries has led to political cooperation and openness in the management of minority-majority relations. A key element of the accession agreements of most states in Central and Eastern Europe was linked to the treatment of national minorities, including the management of the “border” between minority and majority⁴⁶.

The Roma issue, or the issue of the Russians in the Baltic countries, the “inheritance” left by former multinational empires present in past centuries in this space are just some of the sensitive issues. The EU has identified these problems acting both before and after the accession of CEE countries to the EU.

The attachment of these states to the EU is strongly linked to the development of a strong European identity to these people. Most often this feeling does not come into opposition with the attachment to the national or regional / local identity; this is despite the fact that over the last decade we could see an oscillation demonstrating close links between the three types of identities (strengthening of one weakened the other and viceversa).

Amid crises that have become structural, during in the last decade the European identity of EU citizens, linked to the attachment to the Union has been steadily eroded. In parallel, the European citizens have found refuge in national or regional identities. Unfortunately for the EU, these new ways of expressing identity have lead to the strengthening of Euroscepticism, to the development of extremism, nationalism and xenophobia.

The ethno-religious identity brings more cleavages -- borders -- between people.

In what follows we propose an analysis of the influences that various crises have had during the last decade on European, national or local attachment⁴⁷.

If in 2007 the average commitment of European citizens towards the EU was 53%, in 2014 it dropped to 45%. With few exceptions (including Poland and Romania - two countries in the East, one in which there has been economic recession during the crisis and another, Romania, where its citizens have got to have more confidence in Brussels to tackle corruption and poverty only its own state institutions), in European countries the proportion of those who feel attached to the EU declined. It is interesting to note, however, how this decline has occurred in some states. In 2007 we have a high level of adherence to the EU for citizens of countries like Italy, Spain, Belgium, Hungary and Poland. By 2014, the citizens of this state attachment

⁴⁶ For more information, see Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, *Le frontiere europene – espressioni dell'identità*, in *Transylvanian Review*, ISI Journal, vol. XXIII, supliment nr.1, 2014, p. 202-216; Mircea Brie, *European enlargement and new frontiers Central and Eastern Europe*, în *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Series Europaea*, Cluj-Napoca, LIX, 1, 2014, p. 113-130; Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, *Europa: frontiere culturale interne sau areal cultural unitar*, în *Moldoscopia*, nr. 3 (L), 2010, Chişinău, p. 123-143; Alina Stoica, Mircea Brie, *The Cultural frontiers of Europe. Introductory Study*, în *The Cultural frontiers of Europe*, *Eurolimes*, vol. 9, volum editat de Alina Stoica, Didier Francfort, Judit Csoba Simonne, Oradea, 2010, p. 5-8.

⁴⁷ This study develops ideas and conclusions previously shown in the study *Identity rematch in the European space* (2015), elaborated together with Dana Blaga.



evolved very differently. Poland is the only country where the EU attachment is on the increase slope. Hungary and Belgium are two states which show similarities because although knowing a significant decline in the level of attachment to the EU, they do not seem to be cases concerned to transfer that attachment to their countries or places of residence (see comparative Annexes 2-4). Of these five countries, Spain and Italy constitute a special group. In these countries, which have benefited greatly from membership of the European Union, there is a very strong local and regional identity, but also with significant immigrant communities. The drop in devotion to the EU is very steep in Italy (from 62% - 2007 39% - 2014) and Spain (from 62% - 2007 46% - 2014). In these countries, hit hard by the recession, with serious problems of over-indebtedness, where large communities of immigrants accept jobs poorly paid, with high levels of unemployment among natives, attachment citizens are not transferred even to own countries (the attachment in one's country is among the lowest in the EU) but in places of residence, at local or regional level. The strong local or regional identity captures the citizens' attachment to these countries (see Annex 4).

By comparing the two times (2007 and 2014) we found that the attachment to the European Union moves to two categories of states: states in a geographically central axis and to Eastern states. This group of states includes France, Belgium and Germany (central states in the process of European construction), to which, in the same central axis, we would place also Poland, accompanied from the eastern axis by Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and the Baltic States. The logic compels us to accept that in crisis situations, countries such as Germany, France and Belgium and their citizens understand the meaning, role and importance of the European Union. In this equation of confidence in the Union we can place the newly entered EU member states from the east. We wonder, is this the same in the case of identity? The essence and the future support of Europe lies in the New Europe?

By comparison with the attachment to the European Union, the attachment to their own country reveals a different behaviour of citizens of European states. Note that this attachment is high in all European countries, the EU average being 91% in 2014. In the group of countries with a higher share of the population who feel attached to their country except for Austria, the other countries are geographically positioned at the EU's periphery, in the west, north, south and east. We note the geographical distribution of these countries compared to the somewhat compact middle position of countries where the population feels attached to the European Union (2014).

A strong attachment to home settlements, to local or regional area, is obvious in the countries of southern and eastern flanks. Together with Portugal, Poland, Austria, Slovakia and Greece, whose populations are proving to be very attached to their country, the group of countries with the population attached to the local factor lie countries like Italy, Bulgaria and Romania. These latter countries are found to be related to the local community also because of the failure of national policy.

CEE countries generally prove to be attached to the EU now than in 2007. The national and local attachment, even if it strengthens the most part, they are influenced by realities related to domestic politics, to the public confidence in the governing act etc.



2. CULTURAL IDENTITY, DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION⁴⁸

2.1. Concepts

An interesting survey on the topic entitled *Border in a Changing Europe: Dynamics of Openness and Closure*⁴⁹, was published by Gerard Delanty, professor of sociology at the University of Liverpool. The survey starts from the premise that societies are spatially organised through different “border” delimitations. From this perspective, each space may be characterised as open or close depending on the typology of the border delimiting it. Fabienne Maron speaks about “frontières barrières” (characterised by restrictions and visa) to design the opposite of “frontières ouvertes” whose crossing is authorised without restrictions⁵⁰. However, in the context of the new geopolitical mutations in the European area, they all acquire a new significance under the pressure of changes generated by the process of European integration. The old borders fade away leaving room to new border structures resulting from new concepts and approaches on delimitations more or less spatial.

The numerous political borders tend to fade away to fully disappear in importance. In time, former borders turn into mere “symbols of singularity, of independence”⁵¹. At the same time, cultural borders, for instance, acquire an ever more visible functionality. The approach is not only internal, in which case one can identify cultural sub-components specific to the European area; there is also an approach characteristic of the European Union external governance system. Such a cultural border makes clear distinction between Europe and non-Europe. Beyond such a theory that might stress scepticism against certain projects for future enlargements of the European Union, we can notice the use of debates on the issue of actual borders of Europe, an issue raised by analysts for centuries.

The cultural perspective gives birth to debates on the notion of European civilisation unity and on the relationship between geography and culture. Can Europe be separated from Asia as a consequence of the cultural delimitation criterion? Professor Delanty approaches the concept of Christian Europe, as well as that of Europe as an heir of Roman and Greek civilisations⁵². Beyond the geographical, tectonic delimitation of the two continents, is European culture able to impose new borders? It is a question to which European analysts have very different answers. Perspectives are strongly influenced by current geopolitical subjectivism. In the same manner, in the Middle Ages, Europe was constrained to Catholic West clearly separated from expanding Islamism. Through his endeavours, Peter the Great

⁴⁸ This text was developed and revised based on the study Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, *Le frontiere europeee – espressioni dell'identità*, în *Transylvanian Review*, ISI Journal, vol. XXIII, supliment nr.1, 2014, p. 202-216.

⁴⁹ Gerard Delanty, *Border in Changing Europe: Dynamics of Openness and Closure*, in *Eurolimes*, vol. I, *Europe and Its Borders: Historical Perspective* (hereinafter *Eurolimes*, vol. 1), ed. Ioan Horga, Sorin Sipos, Oradea, Institute for Euroregional Studies, 2006, pp. 46-58.

⁵⁰ Fabienne Maron, *Les nouvelles frontières de l'Europe: repenser les concepts*, in *Eurolimes*, vol. 4, *Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers* (hereinafter *Eurolimes*, vol. 4), ed. Gerard Delanty, Dana Pantea, Karoly Teperics, Oradea, Institute for Euroregional Studies, 2007, p. 115.

⁵¹ Erique Banus, *Images of openness – Images of closeness*, in *Eurolimes*, vol. 4, p. 139.

⁵² Gerard Delanty, *op. cit.*, p. 46.



included Russia in the European diplomatic system. Europe expanded as a concept. For the first time in 1716, the *Almanach royal* published in France put the Romanov on the list of European monarch families. This was undoubtedly due to the harmonisation of Russia with other powers in the European diplomatic system⁵³. In 1715, the position of the Ottoman Empire was similar to Russia's from several points of view. It entered the European diplomatic scene at the end of the 15th century. In fact, the entrance of the Turks in the relational system amongst European countries was mainly due to rivalries between France and the Habsburgs⁵⁴. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire did not express as a European state and was never part and parcel of the European diplomatic system all through the 18th century. To Napoleon, the European space meant "French Europe" conceived as a space whose borders had to be settled after pressures on the Ottoman Empire⁵⁵. The examples continue nowadays. Beyond all these, the hypothesis of cultural borders impose certain delimitations that we often assume whether we want it or not.

We do not aim at tracing such borders of the European area. We only point out the fact that our debate imposes rather a characterization on European identity as a spatial notion protected just like a fortress. Is Europe not only politically, but also culturally a space imposing external borders clearly settled from a territorial point of view? Pursuing the evolution in time of the process of European construction, we can conclude by answering this question as follows: in the European Union, external borders are more and more important (more closed!), while the internal ones become more formal than real (more open!). Europe seen as a "fortress" is thus more open, more "hospitable" from the perspective of its members, and more closed, secure and less permissive for the rest of the world. In such a construction, we can identify not only the advantages of the high level of democracy and welfare the Community citizens may enjoy, but also the exclusivity imposed to others by closing the border. After removing internal barriers, Europe starts to become a super-state reinventing the "hard" border protecting states and politically associated people, excluding others that have not benefited from such political decisions. In this context, do external borders of the community become expressions of national state border? It is a difficult matter entailing debates not only on the character and typology of the border, but also on aspects introduced by the fact that the Union does not have a border from within which the exterior may be seen. There are several territories that, from a geographical point of view, are comprised "within" the community while not being part of the European Union. Thus the attempt to trace community border to (physically!) separate the "Europeans" from the "non-Europeans" becomes impossible from a cultural point of view. Though recent, the historical heritage after the cold war imposes not only borders; they also impose actual barriers that cannot be crossed from the point of view of political decisions. Borders remain closed, irrespective of cultural heritage. On the other hand, the process of outlining external borders cannot be finished. Starting from such a remark, people and states that will belong to the "interior" are currently outside the borders. Thus the hard border whose construction is more and more obvious excludes the Europeans, not only the non-Europeans. Consequently, the European border is open or close depending on the exclusive political interests and less from a possible cultural perspective. Hence, political discourses bringing motivations relating to the European cultural heritage concerning European integration of

⁵³ Matthew Anderson, *L'Europe au XVIII^e siècle 1713-1783*, Paris, 1968, p. 156.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 157.

⁵⁵ Gerard Delanty, *op. cit.*, p. 46.



certain states such as Turkey are mere populist actions. It is a political decision of an exclusive club. “Europe is and should remain *a house with many rooms*, rather than a culturally and racially exclusive club”⁵⁶. Thus, the European Community becomes a close territory on political grounds based on identity motivations.

The debates on current European borders have often acquired the image of polemics on their place, role, shape, or consistency. Kalypso Nicolaïdes considers that *Eurolimes* is „un paradigme qui lie l'integration a l'interieur et a l'exterieur, les liens intercultureles, interethniques et interclasses tisses au sein de l'Union d'aujourd'hui et les liens inter-Etats tisses avec ses nouveaux membres potentiels”⁵⁷. Beyond the image of national states' borders, the definition of this paradigm is carried out in the survey entitled *Why Eurolimes?*⁵⁸. According to the same pattern, the *Eurolimes* paradigm designs, according to several researchers in the field, what we understand by “inclusive frontier”⁵⁹, that is, the borders to which the European construction tends. The main idea of the integration process is not to settle barriers, but to attenuate them. From this perspective, internal borders become more and more *inclusive* and less visible. Security and border traffic control are transferred to external borders that become more and more *exclusive*, more restrictive if we respect the logic above⁶⁰. Such a theory is valid up to a point. Internal borders do not simply become more open, more *inclusive*⁶¹; there is an integration process taking place in steps. On the other hand, we cannot consider as fully equal good and *inclusive/open*, or bad and *exclusive/close*. A simple example can confirm our hypothesis: in war areas, borders are relatively open to refugees⁶². However, we cannot conclude that we have an *inclusive* border “open just for pleasure” like European borders to which community integration tends as a model⁶³.

As a methodological and conceptual approach from the perspective of the topic, surveys published in volume 4 of the *Eurolimes* Journal, *Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers*, are very interesting. The debate focuses on possible interpretations on typology, form and structure of the new borders in central and eastern European space after the accession of the first communist countries to the European Union in 2004. The new Europe is made up of eastern territories on the continent. The external border of the EU has been pushed to the east, to the traditional limits of Europe⁶⁴, which entitles us to wonder when and if this enlargement process should stop: before or after reaching these limits? European spaces and peoples might remain outside the more or less *inclusive* border. Then the European border cannot be only

⁵⁶ Robert Bideleux, *The Limits of Europe*, in *Eurolimes*, vol. I, p. 62.

⁵⁷ Kalypso Nicolaïdes, *Les fins de l'Europe*, in Bronislaw Geremek & Robert Picht (ed.), *Visions d'Europe*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2007, p. 287.

⁵⁸ Ioan Horga, *Why Eurolimes*, in *Eurolimes*, vol. I, pp. 5-13.

⁵⁹ Kalypso Nicolaïdes, *op. cit.*, p. 275-290; Jan Zielonka, *Europe Unbund: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union*, London, Routledge, 2002; Idem, *Europe as Empire*, Oxford University Press, 2006; Geremek, Bronislaw, Picht, Robert, *Visions d'Europe*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2007.

⁶⁰ Mircea Brie, *Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers: Case Study Romanian - Ukrainian Frontier*, în Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar (coord.), *Cross-Border Partnersip with Spacial Regard to the Hungarian-Romanian-Ukrainian Tripartite Border*, Oradea-Debrecen, 2010, p. 23-36.

⁶¹ Gerard Delanty, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁶² *Ibidem*, p. 50.

⁶³ Ioan Horga, Mircea Brie, *Europe between Exclusive Borders and Inclusive Frontiers*, în *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Series Europaea, Cluj-Napoca*, 2010, p. 63-86.

⁶⁴ Ioan Horga, Dana Pantea, *Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers*, in *Eurolimes*, vol. 4, p. 7.



geographical with people living on both sides. Cultural distances between people can increase even within the community as the number of immigrants, refugees, and transnational communities is constantly increasing⁶⁵. Moreover, immigrants' integration is mainly crossing an *inclusive* community border⁶⁶.

Beyond cultural and political perspectives, the situation in the past years has shown a new type of *inclusive* border resulting from states' economic interests, either belonging to the community or not. Business development bringing benefits to both sides has been able to provide a more flexible trend to political norms and regulations⁶⁷.

All these and others can identify a process of community transformation developing with passing from *exclusive* to *inclusive* border.

Without greatly differing from others, such a conceptual approach suggests an image of the border from several points of view. The concepts of territory, border, or frontier are historically determined constructions to a great extent. This is how administrative, military, and cultural borders as well as the market focused in territory delimited by border constructions came into being⁶⁸. Yet, in time, the concept of border has been diluting. This is also due to the process of European integration and construction. In certain cases, the physical border has even disappeared, while other "borders" that are no longer superposed over national states have appeared. The globalization process has a considerable influence on the erosion of borders and barriers crossing the European continent⁶⁹. In the European Union, there are several governing systems, cultures and administrative borders. Many of them do not coincide with national borders. At the same time, the multinational and transnational character of some organisations funded by community programmes lead to integrating huge areas devoid of barriers against communication, cooperation, working together, cross-border circulation.

In general, the concept of border is associated with the *hard* physical border, a concept related to the barrier that can be crossed provided certain special conditions and requirements (visa to enter that country is the best example of a restrictive requirement in the case of *hard* border). On the other hand, a state can have *hard* borders with a neighbouring country, while having *soft*, open borders with another neighbouring country⁷⁰. A border can be both *hard* and *soft* at the same time. A state can eliminate visas for the citizens of a state while strengthening and reinforcing requirements in border control⁷¹. In the European Union, community institutions suggest that Member States should have *hard* external borders and *soft* internal borders. Visa, border police control on people and goods crossing the border are characteristic of *hard* border. Unlike this type of border, the *soft* border is characteristic of a more flexible

⁶⁵ Kalypso Nicolaides, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

⁶⁶ Chris Quispel, *The opening of the Dutch borders. Legal and illegal migration to the Netherlands 1945-2005*, in *Eurolimes*, vol. 4, pp. 102-110.

⁶⁷ Jaroslav Kundera, *L'Europe elargie sans frontiere monetaire*, in *Ibidem*, pp. 69-77.

⁶⁸ Charles S. Maier, *Does Europe Need a Frontier? From Territorial to Redistributive Community*, in Jan Zilonka (ed.), *Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Governance and European Union*, London, New York, Routledge, 2002, pp. 17-37.

⁶⁹ Nanette Neuwahl, *What Borders for Which Europe?*, in Joan DeBardeleben (ed.), *Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe*, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2005, p. 24.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁷¹ See Olga Potemkina, *A „Friendly Schengen Border” and Illegal Migration: The Case of the EU and its Direct Neighbourhood*, in *Ibidem*, pp. 165-182.



transit system with no restrictions of circulation for goods and persons⁷². There are several steps to reach this type of border. They consist of the following: eliminating visa, reducing taxes for people and goods to zero, facilitating and strengthening human contacts on both sides of the border including cultural, educational, and training programmes, etc.

Without getting into details, we wish to show some concepts leading to the same interpretations in general lines. Besides, several authors consider that *hard*, *exclusive*, *close*, *sharp-edges* or *barrier* are equal. They are all associated with restrictions and strict control being characterised by the numerous conditions imposed to those intending to cross them. On the other hand, *soft*, *open*, *inclusive*, *porous*, *communicative* or *bridge* type borders remove transit restrictions by rendering traffic more flexible⁷³.

From another perspective, Charles Maier identifies three possible conceptual approaches of the border⁷⁴: the first, „*positive and constructive*”, considered as a border providing political order and good neighbouring relationships; the second, „*negative and revolutionary*”, seen as an illogical obstacle against normality, peace and unity; and the third approach, „*dialectical and evolutionary*”, characterised by the dissolution of a border and the inevitable settling of another, yet not necessarily at the same level of formality.

Another approach originates in the clear separation of people, institutions and organisations as compared to the European Union. The perspective is either internal, in which case the border does not constraint community expression, or external, in which case the border interferes as a barrier, as an obstacle against freedom of circulation. Thus, the European Union is the expression of a *fortress* protecting its citizens against external perils (immigrants, imports, insecurity, etc.)⁷⁵. Such a perspective released again and doubled by the trend for world anti-terrorist fight has more and more supporters amongst political leaders of the European Union Member States. Joint or not, the security policy has provided new coordinates and even European neighbourhood policy despite the fact that many countries neighbouring the EU are not insecurity “exporters”. In this context, the issue of immigration turns more and more into a security issue⁷⁶ that has to be managed even through a reform of the border crossing system.

2.2. Identity and cultural borders of the European space

The trends expressed in the scientific environment of the European culture are either gathered around the concept of *cultural homogeneity*, a phenomenon in a strong causal connection with globalisation, or it designates an existing reality that cannot be denied or eliminated, that is *cultural diversity*. In the first case, we deal with universalization and uniformity of values, images and ideas broadcast by media or cultural industry. Within such construction, regional and national character suffers, as one may notice the insertion of a means of cultural “predominance” mainly issued by the United States of America, also known as

⁷² Joan DeBardeleben, *Introduction*, in *Ibidem*, p. 11.

⁷³ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁴ Charles S. Maier, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-43.

⁷⁵ Gerard Delanty, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.

⁷⁶ See Régis Matuszewicz, *Vers la fin de l'Élargissement?*, in Laurent Beurdeley, Renaud de La Brosse, Fabienne Maron (coord.), *L'Union Européenne et ses espaces de proximité. Entre stratégie inclusive et partenariats removes: quell avenir pour le nouveau voisinage de l'Union?*, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2007, pp. 103-117; Gabriel Wackermann, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-84.



“Americanisation” of world culture⁷⁷. In the second case, cultural diversity involves plurality of ideas, images, values and expressions. They are all possible through a variety of expression and the presence of a great number of parallel local, regional, ethnic, national, etc. cultures. Moreover, given the context, certain authors speak of “identity revenge” and the “feeling of returning to historical, national and cultural identity”, particularly in an area such as Central and Eastern Europe and at a historical time when national features and identity are compelled to be redefined by being more open to the new geopolitical, historical, or cultural configurations⁷⁸. Beyond the relative epistemological antagonism of the approach, our debate can have slight variations. The field of cultural cooperation tends to become „multipolar”, as the concept of “cultural networks” is introduced. These networks have begun to shatter old structures and support identity, communication, relationship and information⁷⁹. International stakeholders acquire an ever more important role; their projects, ideas, methods or structures, in other words their identity, are not only more visible (thus acquiring a multiplying effect on others); they are also more specific and particular in expression⁸⁰.

Is the European culture global or specific? Can we speak of cultural globalisation? Or, is the European culture going cosmopolite? Which is the place of the traditional, the ethnic, the national, the specific and the particular? The debate makes room to the equation global v local, general v particular. National and regional cultures do not disappear under the immediate acceleration of globalisation due to the increasing interest in local culture. Considered as a general process, globalisation is “characterised by multiplication, acceleration and strengthening of economic, political, social and cultural interaction between actors all over the world”⁸¹. If generalised, this cultural globalisation does not have the same influence throughout Europe⁸².

a. Europe: culture of cultures⁸³

The numerous political borders tend to have a decreasing importance in the European Union area to the point of fading away. In time, the former borders turn into mere “symbols of

⁷⁷ *La culture au cœur. Contribution au débat sur la culture et le développement en Europe*, Groupe de travail européen sur la culture et le développement, Editions du Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg, 1998, p. 255-258

⁷⁸ Doina David, Călin Florea, *Arhetipul cultural și conceptul de tradiție*, in *The Proceedings of the European Integration-Between Tradition and Modernity Congress 2nd Edition*, Editura Universității „Petru Maior”, Târgu Mureș, 2007, p. 645-646

⁷⁹ Pehn, Gudrun, *La mise en réseau des cultures. Le rôle des réseaux culturels européens*, Editions du Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg, 1999, p. 8

⁸⁰ Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, *Le frontiere culturali europee: tra l’identità dello spazio europeo e le politiche comunitarie*, în Sorin Șipoș, Gabriel Moisa, Mircea Brie, Florin Sfrengu, Ion Gumenăi (coord.), *The Historian’s Atelier. Sources, Methods, Interpretations*, Academia Română, Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj-Napoca, 2012, p. 107-126.

⁸¹ Jean Tardif, Joëlle Farchy, *Les enjeux de la mondialisation culturelle*, Éditions Hors Commerce, Paris, 2006, p. 107-108

⁸² Alina Stoica, Mircea Brie, *The Cultural frontiers of Europe. Introductory Study*, în *The Cultural frontiers of Europe, Eurolimes*, vol. 9, volum editat de Alina Stoica, Didier Francfort, Judit Csoba Simonne, Oradea, 2010, p. 5-8.

⁸³ This text was developed and revised based on the study Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, *Europa: frontiere culturale interne sau areal cultural unitar*, în *Moldoscopie*, nr. 3 (L), 2010, Chișinău, p. 123-143.



singularity and independence”⁸⁴. At the same time, cultural borders acquire a new ever more visible role. It is not only an internal approach, when cultural “sub-elements” specific to the European area can be identified; it is also an approach characteristic of governance external to the European Union. This cultural border makes a clear-cut distinction between Europe and non-Europe. This perspective raising the issue of the unity of the European civilisation and providing the image of a European cultural set (divided into cultural “sub-elements”) is crushed by the supporters of national cultures of European peoples. The “culture of cultures” idea lays stress on cultures’ specifics, yet acknowledging its unity. Basically, cultural borders are contact areas providing communication and cooperation to avoid barriers between the European peoples or cultures.

Cultural diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism are elements specific to the European area. The European integration process is complex; it does not impose and is not conditioned by the idea of cultural unity, or the existence of a common culture including all Europeans. Specificity and diversity are precisely the means of intercultural dialogue between European peoples. Each European society has to find their own integrating solutions depending on traditions and institutions. The integrating model used in Germany might not work in France. There are salient differences between the model of the French assimilation policy and the tolerance expressed in the United Kingdom. If we expand this approach to Central and Eastern European area, differences are even more striking.

European societies and cultures do not reject each other in the European construction equation. It is a time when each can learn from the experience and expertise of others. The ex-communist Eastern and Central European countries have undergone a process of transition to a democratic model after 1990. Yet, this democratic model involves accepting diversity including the acknowledgement of national minorities’ claims. In some situations, cultural expression and political responses to claims did not rise to the occasion. Unfortunately, the result was military solutions.

In Western Europe, minorities have gradually earned a long-term recognition of autonomy and equity in point of national resources (from this point of view, there are contrasts with the sudden changes in Central and Eastern Europe turning into intense manifestations due to minorities’ claims and resistance of the majority). There is not the same situation in the rights of minorities originating from old European colonies. Upon their proposal, there is the issue of social status, financial means and relationship between European cultures and cultures in the regions of origin⁸⁵.

b. European cultural identity: between common values and common interests

Irrespective of the approaches on diversity and multiple identities from a cultural point of view, Europe can be conceived as an organic cultural structure despite disruptions that may occur between the elements making up its complex structure. Considering this approach, the European culture is built on an intricate system of common values characterising the European cultural area. Just like isles making up an archipelago, despite some areas delimitating it, the

⁸⁴ Erique Banus, *Images of openness – Images of closeness*, in *Eurolimes*, vol. 4, *Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers*, ed. Gerand Delanty, Dana Pantea, Karoly Teperics, Institutul de Studii Euroregionale, Oradea, 2007, p. 139

⁸⁵ *La culture au cœur...*, p. 69



European cultural area is made up of elements that can be characterised as organic structures with a certain composition in point of shape and expression. The areas limiting these “insular” cultural areas interpreted as cultural borders from the perspective of our approach are disruptions within an organic cultural system: Europe. This cultural area is organic and has specific relations with the neighbouring cultural areas.

The classical criterion for cultural location connecting a cultural area to a people speaking the same language, having the same lifestyle and behaviour, etc., can be replaced by some criteria defining the common and organic cultural area of the Europeans.

We first refer to common cultural values due to which we can confirm today the existence of a cultural reality specific to the European area. In the survey entitled *The Cultural Frontiers of Europe: Our Common Values*, Rudolf Rezsöhazi develops the common values of the European cultural area on new elements conferring specificity and unity⁸⁶: 1. The Greek-Roman civilisation as a basis to build the European culture and spirit; 2. The values of Christianity starting with basic notions, such as the single and personal God, the concept of salvation and damnation of man, love, justice, solidarity and fraternity of man (all men are considered sons of the same Father); 3. Middle Ages and mediaeval civilisation; 4. Renaissance and Reform; 5. Enlightenment; 6. Political and industrial revolution; 7. Capitalism and socialism; 8. Development, progress and welfare of post-war history; 9. Family as core value of our society⁸⁷.

Another approach conferring unity to the European area refers to common interests of Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern and Western Europe have undergone a process of political, economic, military and environmental integration⁸⁸. The fight against terrorism and the fear of military wars, the fear of increasing world population associated with poverty and migration to Western Europe raise the following dilemma: integration or national identity? Which is the role of the EU in this situation? The answers to these questions have to be sought in the following fields: culture, history, religion, economy and security⁸⁹. Besides divergences separating the Europeans, the current context brings to the foreground the strong determinism recorded by the integrationist trend triggered by common interest.

An area with common values and interests is able to build and strengthen its common identity character. There is also the relation with the non-European area. From this point of view, the European cultural area takes a distinct form as compared to other cultural types and systems. Thus, there is a cultural border around cultural Europe. Such cultural border makes a clear distinction between Europe and non-Europe. Besides this theory laying stress on scepticism concerning certain projects for future enlargement of the European Union, we can

⁸⁶ Rudolf Rezsöhazi, *The Cultural Frontiers of Europe: Our Common Values*, *EuroTimes*, vol. 4, *Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive*, ed. Gerard Delanty, Dana Pantea, Karoly Teperics, Institutul de Studii Euroregionale, Oradea, 2008, p. 164-169

⁸⁷ Ioan Horga, Mircea Brie, *Europe: A Cultural Border, or a Geo-cultural Archipelago*, in *The Cultural frontiers of Europe*, *EuroTimes*, vol. 5, volume edited by Alina Stoica, Didier Francfort, Judit Csoba Simonne, Oradea, 2010, p. 155-169.

⁸⁸ Ivan Dubnička, *Les intérêts communs de l'Europe*, in Laurent Beurdeley, Renaud de La Brosse, Fabienne Maron (coord.), *L'Union Européenne et ses espaces de proximité. Entre stratégie inclusive et partenariats* removes: *quell avenir pour le nouveau voisinage de l'Union?*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007, p. 299

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 299-309



notice the use of debating on the issue of the real borders of Europe, an issue approached by analysts for centuries.

Thus, we identify at least two cultural identity constructions on the European level: a culture of cultures, that is, a cultural area with a strong identity on the particular, local, regional and national levels, or a cultural archipelago, that is, a joint cultural area with disruptions. No matter the perspective, the existence of a European cultural area is not denied, whether we speak of diversity or “disrupted continuity”. The European culture seen as a “house with many rooms” does not exclude the existence of the “house” or the “rooms”. The natural question arising from this perspective is as follows: are specific cultures completely integrated in the general European cultural area? The answer seems natural. Our European identity supposes a basic reality. Besides, the particularity of the European culture is provided by diversity and multiculturalism as means of expression on the local, regional or national levels. Consequently, the European cultural area is an area with strong identity both particularly and generally. The phrase “culture of cultures” is appropriate from this point of view. As to identifying cultural borders, we can notice the fact that cultural contact areas belong to at least two categories: internal areas between local, regional or national elements; external areas that impose the delimitation around what European culture is. Both approaches used in this paper do not exclude each other despite the conceptual opposition. The existence of national cultural areas does not exclude the existence of a common European cultural area. In fact, it is precisely this reality that confers the European area a special cultural identity. Europe can be conceived as a cosmopolite space, a media-cultural space where cultural security can turn into an element of preservation of a European common identity, besides the approaches we have referred to. Facing economic pressure generated by the economic policies, today’s Europe responds to the whole world as a powerful common cultural area through the EU. Do peoples’ identities disappear in this equation? The debate has to comprise approaches starting from the definition of the place of the national in the context of the European construction process. Can the nationalism specific to the 19th and 20th centuries Europe be extrapolated to peoples in a different concept, that of Europeanism? Besides the slight variations of the approach, “nationalism” can be European. In this case, Europe as a whole is strengthened as a structure in construction including the cultural perspective.



3. INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT⁹⁰

The issue of national minorities is, in the process of European construction, one of the most important aspects that European countries have had to manage. Learning about and researching minorities, for then to transmit knowledge and experience to young people through education, have become an essential pillar of European values on the construction of an intercultural society based on direct and indiscriminate cooperation and collaboration between ethno-religious communities. It is known that European legislation and practice promote the idea of living together in the sense of social value consisting in accepting otherness, good understanding of the various ethnic groups within the same local communities and openness to communication and cooperation.

The European education should not be directed exclusively to knowing the minority communities, but also to understanding the mechanisms of management and development of partnership relations between the minority and the majority.

3.1. Identity of national minorities: levels of educational analysis⁹¹

The complexity of education concerning national minorities is given by the need for multiple approaches on different levels and with various depths of analysis that require interdisciplinary conceptual and methodological references. Thus the diachronic analysis of demographic realities is combined with the analysis regarding legislative, administrative-political, cultural-educational, social-economic, linguistic issues, all filtered by European values, framework and national or European framework.

a. The conceptual-methodological perspective

Methodologically, to describe the epistemological between majority and minority, it is necessary to distinguish between the demographic and the sociological dimensions of the sense in which these concepts are analyzed. *Demographically*, the majority - minority relationship describes a situation of difference in volume between two ethnically differentiated segments, which co-exist in a territorial administrative framework, usually within a State. In *sociological* sense, minority - majority rapports describe a situation of asymmetry between groups in terms of power or authority, essentially a subordination report of the community (communities) by a

⁹⁰ For more information, see Mircea Brie, *Perspective de analiză interdisciplinară privind învățarea despre minoritățile etno-naționale*, în Mircea Brie, Karla Barth, Dragoș Dărbăneanu, Istvan Polgar (coord.), *Integrarea europeană și reformarea educației românești. Comunicarea interculturală și dialogul multiethnic*, Debrecen University Press, 2021, p. 97-160.

⁹¹ This text was developed and revised based on the study Mircea Brie, *National minorities: levels of educational analysis*, in Karla Melinda Barth, Mircea Brie, Dragoș Dărbăneanu, István Polgár, *The Role of Intercultural Communication in Adapting Ethnic Groups to the European Union Social Space*, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2019, p. 371-391 (versiunea revizuită în limba engleză a lucrării Mircea Brie, *Minoritățile naționale: niveluri de analiză educațională*, în Vasile Cucerescu, Enrique Banus, Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Ioan Horga (coord.), *Ghidul Uniunii Europene în școală între educația formală și neformală*, Chișinău, 2014, p. 52-71).



majority dominant minority⁹². The distinction between the two perspectives - demographic and sociological - is required from a very simple reason: institutional arrangements for the management of relations of power and authority do not necessarily overlap with demographic reports. Or, in a simpler way: the power do not always belong to the many, but to the groups which control the resources of power and authority in a society that can be minority in the demographic sense⁹³.

Another important issue is the establishment of national and ethnic identity of a person or community. On the one hand, the discussion encompasses objective and subjective elements of identification and on the other hand, the analysis involves a reference to the identification of two perspectives: self-identification and hetero-identification.

Ethnicity and religious confession are concepts around which discussions and controversy arise, generating emotions and feelings of extreme intensity. Each of us belongs to such communities. By default, there is a strong pressure on us to be subjective. Intercultural dialogue can be successfully provided where a community that is aware of the others comes to communicate, to cooperate, and to build the structure of a multicultural society. Studies have shown that ethnic and religious diversity is poor when missing openness to other communities. On the other hand, this diversity, as is the case throughout Central and South-Eastern Europe, reveals the less desirable realities. Today we are talking both about discrimination, marginalization, low-status minorities, peripheral societies, inequitable distribution of resources; therefore, we can conclude that the majority-minority relations management highlights the demographic aspect (quantitative) and on the sociological aspect, i.e. distribution of authority and power⁹⁴.

The current context of crisis, which is not only financial and economic, but also political, social, mental and even ideological, shows on the one hand the need to strengthen dialogue, and on the other the trends of returning to certain forms of nationalism and cultural cleavage. Without advocating for one or the other of these trends, we can see that Europe is at a crossroads. The old forms of social-political and economic life are being redefined, and relations between people and communities are resettling on new organization and relational forms. Conversely, in a Europe without borders, more and more types of borders appear. Previously, we have called them “symbolic and ideological frontiers”⁹⁵. This is because they are, most often, not tangible. From Europeanism to nationalism, from ethno-religious identity to cultural identity, and to social cleavages, the wide range of approaches of these borders could continue in the context of implementation of an effective European Neighbourhood Policy. The physical border of the European Union's external limit can “open” in time, but new types of

⁹² Traian Rotariu, Petru Iluț (coord.), *Introducere în sociologie*, Cluj-Napoca, 1996.

⁹³ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁴ Mircea Brie, *Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Dialogue in the European Border Space*, in Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Sorin Șipoș, *Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union's East Border*, Editura Universității din Oradea/Editura Universității din Debrecen, supliment *Eurolimes*, Oradea/Debrecen, 2011, p. 11.

⁹⁵ Mircea Brie, *European Culture between Diversity and Unity*, în *Analele Universității din Oradea, Seria Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene*, 2010, p. 79-92; Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, *The European Union External Border. An Epistemological Approach*, în *Revista Română de Geografie Politică*, 2009, p. 15-31; Ioan Horga, Mircea Brie, *Europe: A Cultural Border, or a Geo-cultural Archipelago*, în *The Cultural frontiers of Europe*, *Eurolimes*, vol. 5, volume edited by Alina Stoica, Didier Francfort, Judit Csoba Simonne, Oradea, 2010, p. 155-169.



frontiers can occur between people and communities. Immigrants, for instance, live in the European Union and maintain their own identity, thus creating a world that “refuses integration” by the specificity that it develops. We are therefore able to identify a cleavage between this kind of community and the majority, a cleavage that can take the form of symbolic cultural borders that sometimes turn into an “external” border.

In the current context, many European societies develop a strong sense of “self-protection,” which takes not only an economic form, but also one of preservation of their identity and culture. Moments of crisis or excitement can easily lead to the emergence of nationalist sentiments that dilute the “Europeanist” perception of the border. Such a dilution occurs in parallel with the strengthening of identity-community cohesion, in the spirit of ethno-cultural belonging to a nation. It is a time when many European nations have reaffirmed that they “regain identity” by returning to the national, despite the “unity” and solidarity affirmed at the level of European institutions through officials of Member States. National borders, created in different periods and historical and political contexts, have contributed to national economic integration and the cultural periphery. In the current context, with the EU accession of the Central and Eastern Europe states, there has been a reverse phenomenon—the disintegration of the national market and administrative decentralization have led to the integration of peripheries in the national systems, including the cultural. Powerful currents are currently channelled in the direction of cross-border cooperation, eroding the idea of the compact and relatively isolated national bloc⁹⁶. In terms of cultural relations, it is obvious that we are now dealing with a streamlining of trades without being able to talk about a loss of national, regional or local specificity. Cultural specificity brings into question the cultural border, separating different areas of identity and building what we call the European cultural space of cultures.

In the approach, an important element of reference is the sub-or multi-national, local or diaspora, not least in the European and international context⁹⁷. Beyond any approach, the image of European culture has been given by associating concepts of people-culture-history and territory that give a certain local specificity. Through this report, we identify, beyond a European culture, a cultural space with national, regional and local specificities. Therefore, we identify at least two European cultural identity constructions—a culture of cultures, namely a cultural space with a strong identity at individual, local, regional, and national levels, or a cultural archipelago, namely a common cultural space interrupted by discontinuities. Whatever the perspective, the existence of a European cultural area is not denied, even if it is either diversity or “continuity interrupted”⁹⁸.

However, we increasingly find that Europe is at a turning point, in terms of more than ideology. The association of state-nation-territory-border involves some nuances. In the current geopolitical context, we could say that the era of nation states, as we known them, is being redefined and reshaped in a different sense. “Borders” between communities have been increasingly occurring within states. Non-integrated immigrants (unwanted by the majority!)

⁹⁶ Muller, Uwe; Schultz, Helge (2002), *National Borders and Economic Desintegration in Modern East Central Europe*, *Franfurter Studien zum Grenzen*, vol. 8, Berliner Wissenschaft Verlag, Berlin, p. 205.

⁹⁷ Bennett, Tony (2001), *Differing diversities. Transversal study on the Theme of Cultural policy and cultural diversity*, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, p. 29-32.

⁹⁸ Ioan Horga, Mircea Brie, *op. cit.*, p. 157.



are increasingly numerous. Discrimination and marginalization are forcing them to isolate and to respond as parallel “existential forms” to the state in which they live.

Our approach could be too simplistic if we only debate the ideas of classic immigrants or national minorities. Introducing the concept of *extraterritoriality* in the approach to ethnicity and intercultural dialogue seems mandatory for a proper understanding of European realities in this field. A subject that has been intensively debated at European level is the Roma, or Gypsies. Comments relating to the expulsion of the Roma from France and their forced repatriation to Romania and Bulgaria have filled the pages of European newspapers. Events in mid-September 2011 in Bulgaria relating to the “revolt” against the Roma in many cities of the country south of the Danube have exposed a cruel reality that needs to be on the agenda of all institutions of Europe. Extremist groups in Bulgaria gathered masses of people who chanted racist slogans as well as becoming violent and destroying Roma properties. Following such shocking events came the calling for the removal of the Roma from Bulgaria by extremists. So, while France repatriates them to Bulgaria, the Bulgarians banish them—but to where? The Roma are members of a great people living in many European countries, but a people without its own territory and without its own state. Tackling the Roma in Europe is therefore a problem for Europe as a whole and not a certain state, and not of South Central-Eastern Europe as a region only, as is the very wrong impression of the West. Extraterritoriality, both as a concept and a starting point in managing the problems of an ethnic minority (but not national!) becomes, therefore, a reality that invokes new clarifications and the rethinking of European policies.

Another example, which falls somewhat into the same category of discussions on “non-traditional minority,” is in Central and Eastern Europe where there are issues related to granting dual citizenship to members of ethnic groups. The most persistent in the mass media are the granting of dual citizenship to Romanian ethnics in Moldova and to the Hungarian ethnics from countries around Hungary (during public debates, a strong emphasis has been put on the pros and cons of the disputes from Slovakia and Romania, where Hungarian communities are more numerous). The topic has gained special importance through the fact that this dual citizenship, even if individually granted, peaked so high that it sent the message that dual citizenship was granted in mass to groups and communities, hence the hope (or fear) of the possible creation of “Little Hungaries” in southern Slovakia and central Romania.

b. The demographic perspective

It enables the analysis and visualization of the quantitative and structure dimensions of the population on national-ethnic or religious groups. The perspective is useful and necessary in education because it offers the possibility of viewing the various techniques and procedures of the big picture on ethno-religious structure. The instrumentation used can also be very diverse, ranging from maps to various graphics and schematic presentations so that the assimilation of information could be as rapid and substantiated by spatial and temporal connections as possible.

The ethnic group share may be related to the social, economic or political status that it has. Reference is made then to the role of socio-economic or political factors. Finally, majority-minority relations management are managed through a proper demographic analysis that includes a mandatory approach of the diachronic dimension.



Natural, territorial, social mobility of the minorities is also important in the equation for education analysis. Demographic information can provide in this case data for analysis that lead to complex comparative approach in relation to the majority.

Family, marital status and family “values” are all put in a wider context of a cultural nature, to able to complete the demographic picture and ethnic sociological landscape of a politico-geographical space.

c. The administrative-political perspective

Particular attention should be paid to the presence of minorities in public, especially in the political and administrative sphere. Education concerning national minorities allows the analysis on the degree of their political and administrative involvement. The presence of minorities must be analyzed by reference to the legislative framework and, then, to the real possibilities of their minority representation.

Regarding the political and the sociological research we should reserve a special place to the analysis of minorities political leaders’ discourses present in local or national public space. The degree of involvement, the political and administrative claims, public discourse violence are important indicators that can elucidate, at least in part, the relationship between majority and minority.

Nationalism, fundamentalism and extremism in public are concepts strictly related to this relationship. Educators and trainers play a fundamental role in shaping and building an intercultural society based on communication and cooperation.

Another level of educational analysis has as a central topic the degree of activism and political passivity of national minorities in a country.

Territorial autonomy based on ethnic criteria, sensitive in most European countries, is necessary to be introduced in educational curricula in order to build a complete conceptual analysis.

d. Legal perspective

The analysis of the legal framework and the legislation on national minorities is particularly important in view of ensuring a healthy and fair education. In the European countries the law guarantees equal protection for all citizens and punishes discrimination, ensures full and effective equality before the law for all citizens and includes provisions to combat discrimination and xenophobia.

The analysis of the legal framework that refers to minorities must be made through a clear presentation of minority rights in public, of the status of minorities from the legal standpoint, with collective rights and freedoms, but also through the presentation of negative or positive discrimination at legislative and institutional levels.

Not least, important are the legislative references concerning the possibility of conservation and preservation of the identity of minorities and promoting the principles of equality and non-discrimination in relation to the majority.

The legal, regulatory framework must always be presented through a comparative analysis, by analogy with the realities of the everyday life through a qualitative perspective that highlights the extent to which fundamental differences arise in relation to the “ideal” legislative framework.



e. Cultural-educational perspective

Education in mother tongue plays a decisive role in the promotion and preservation of ethnic minorities. The educational process regarding national minorities should give a special place to the analysis of access to specific education of young members of all ethnic groups.

The cultural specificity of minorities in education and the promotion and preservation of cultural identity could be extended to mainstream education, even in the case of the majority. Such an approach would lead to a deeper understanding of the specificity of these national communities. Not least, a special attention must be paid, through education, to the cultural analysis regarding minorities in public. The presence of these minority cultures in public education, in the public sphere in general, contribute to an intercultural society and intercultural dialogue favored by cultural mixture and the formation of contact culture.

Intercultural education can contribute to society so that it would not remain at the stage of multiculturalism, but would develop into a intercultural one. The analysis can be developed in this equation by a study of cultural otherness, an approach that can be placed in contrast with ethnocentrism⁹⁹. Elements of cultural specificity, plurality and cultural rhetoric or mental inheritance may be associated in an interdisciplinary complex construction, which includes elements of history, anthropology, literature and social psychology¹⁰⁰.

f. National vs. European debate perspective

The education concerning national minorities becomes even more complex when the issue occurs in the process of European construction. If in discussions on national education in the past, the focus was on national interest now it extends to a wide sphere of higher interest, i.e. Europe. The two approaches may overlap or, under different approaches can compete. The intensity of the feeling of belonging to national values, and respectively European, plays a key role in shaping educational policies centered on their national group or on a broader range of Europeanist manner.

Our debate can be thus conducted towards the equation of a complex analysis concerning the national interest, and respectively, in the European interest. European cultural diversity can have contrasts; it can enter into a competition with the interest of promoting national unity. Patriotism, as a concept and educational current becomes one that deserves the benefit of a clear and careful approach in the context of European integration.

This analysis can also be extended towards the prospect of education which includes a debate about European values that are needed to be promoted and integrated into the education of European states. Respect for human dignity, respect and promotion of freedom, democracy, equality, human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities appear to be fundamental and defining constructions on which an education system can be built for and about national minorities in Europe.

⁹⁹ Pierre Dasen, Christiane Perregaux, Micheline Rey, *Educația Interculturală. Experiențe, politici, strategii*, Polirom, Iași, 1999, p. 112-119.

¹⁰⁰ See Martine Abdallah-Pretceille, Louis Porcher, *Education et communication interculturelle*, Presse Universitaires de France, 1996.



g. Other analytic perspectives

Knowledge-centered education of minorities, the understanding of ethnic relations management requires a level of education centered on a **linguistic perspective**. Promotion and preservation of the mother tongue, communication in the mother tongue in public or promoting multilingualism can be defining elements in such educational system. The discussion supposes two aspects: on the one hand, European education should enable national minorities to have education in their mother tongue, on the other hand, the introduction in the school curriculum and the development of topics related to the sphere of knowing and promotion of minority languages, to the necessity of developing multilingual societies. Formalizing minority languages, because of the topic sensitivity, is suitable for discussion and analysis within the educational system.

Perspective of ethnicity - religion association: is likely to lead to a clearer understanding of the specific ethnic groups. It is both possible and necessary to make the ethno-religious identity association, and also relationship of these communities with the majority. Elements of analysis of the violence seen in inter-religious conflict versus contemporary ecumenism fall in the same vein of knowledge and understanding of minorities.

In the same direction, i.e. promotion and understanding specific minority communities, can be included the **socio-economic perspective** (it may address topics such as socio-economic status of minorities or socio-economic integration of minorities, including immigrants) or **perspective of everyday life** (habitat and everyday forms of expression of minorities, or customs, traditions and specificities of minorities are some of the specific issues that need further research).

3.2. Considerations on the Romanian model of interethnic relations management. Case study

It is known that European legislation and practice promote the idea of living together, in the sense of social value consisting of acceptance of otherness, good understanding of the various ethnic groups within the same local communities and openness to communication and cooperation. There is a standpoint recognized both by most political and civic leaders, and by the specialized literature at home and abroad, according to which there is now talk of national existence of the “Romanian model of interethnic relations”, an intercultural model based the values of comity and cooperation. The Romanian model of interethnic coexistence components stem from a rich historical experience and from the ability to adapt the concept to the demands of the modern exigencies¹⁰¹. Although all ethnic minorities are represented in Parliament, there are still many ethnic and religious controversies related to the language of instruction in schools, street names, role and function of ethnic universities, restitution of church property and of other property taken by force by the former communists in the past etc. But the people stand up to these dilemmas, ethnic Romanians and Hungarians equally agreed to resolve disagreements in a manner which is tolerant, respectful and democratic¹⁰². The key element in the experience of addressing diversity in Romania is the process of moving the emphasis from ethnic identity to civic identity. Might it not be the universal recipe or the best remedy for each state in addressing

¹⁰¹ Iuliu Furo, *Păstrarea identității minorităților naționale*, în Lucian Năstasă, Levente Scarlat (ed.), *Relații interetnice în România postcomunistă*, Fundația CRDE, 2000, p. 221

¹⁰² James Rosapepe, *Relații interetnice în România*, în Lucian Năstasă, Levente Scarlat (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 21



ethnic diversity, but it certainly is a basic ingredient. Civic identity encourages individuals to assume not only equal rights but also equal responsibilities¹⁰³.

Ethnic and religious structure of the population in Romania (2011)

Ethnic structure		Religious structure	
ROMANIA	20121641	ROMANIA	20121641
Romanian	16792868	Orthodox	16307004
Hungarian	1227623	Romano-catholic	870774
Roma	621573	Reformed	600932
Ukrainian	50920	Pentecostal	362314
German	36042	Greek-catholic	150593
Turk	27698	Baptist	112850
Russian-Lipova	23487	Seventh-day Adventist	80944
Tatars	20282	Muslim	64337
Serbian	18076	Unitarian	57686
Slovaks	13654	Jehovah witnesses	49820
Bulgarian	7336	Evangelicals	42495
Croatian	5408	Old Rite Christian	32558
Greek	3668	Evangelical Lutheran	20168
Italian	3203	Serbian Orthodox	14385
Jews	3271	Evangelical	15514
Check	2477	Evangelical Augustan	5399
Polish	2543	Mosaic	3519
Chinese	2017	Armenian	393
Armenian	1361	Other religion	30557
Csángós	1536	No religion	18917
Macedonian	1264	Atheist	20743
Other ethnicity	18524		


Source: INS. Recensământul populației și locuințelor. <http://www.recensamantromania.ro/>

This ethnic and confessional structure of the Romanian population is not only the natural result of development unaltered by brutal political interventions.

Political decisions, especially those taken during the dictatorial political and extremist regimes during the twentieth century were able to seriously affect ethno-religious realities of the Romanian space, especially in Transylvania. Be it the Hungarian or Romanian authorities during the two world wars or the communist dictatorship, decisions were taken that changed the ethnic map of the Romanian space.¹⁰⁴ Suffice it to recall the drama of the Jewish community of the Second World War or the „sale” of the Germans and the Jews by the Communists in the postwar period.

¹⁰³ Petre Roman, *Experiența abordării diversității în România*, în Lucian Năstasă, Levente Scarlat (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 180

¹⁰⁴ Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Sorin Șipoș (coord.), *Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union's East Border*, Editura Universității din Debrecen/Editura Universității din Oradea, Debrecen/Oradea, 2011.



Termination of political pluralism along with the establishment of the communist regime brought significant disturbances in the ethnic and confessional structures. The communist state tried to replicate the same system in these structures, too. The state tried to homogenize the population. Decisions were taken to ban churches such as the Greek Catholic, Pentecostal, Baptist, Adventist, etc., much of this population returning to the Orthodox Church. At the same time, with approval from the state, a large part of the Hebrew, German and Hungarian ethnics emigrated, thus significantly reducing their number in the region.

Amid dismantling the communist regime, domestically and in the context of excesses of nationalism recorded in the ex-Soviet space, Romania will introduce a series of instruments to make the programme for inclusion of ethnic minorities operational; these instruments are capable in theory to meet all the needs and demands of the minority communities. Under international pressure particularly exercised by the US and the EU, interested in maintaining stability in this part of Europe (see the riots in Targu Mures in March 1990), Romania will effectively adopt an electoral law (92/1990) whose provisions will promote measures of positive discrimination with reference to ethnic minorities.¹⁰⁵ With a very important activity for both the Hungarian community, and for other ethnic communities, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), founded in 1989, will unquestionably contribute to the change the status of minorities in Romania, especially after 1996 (the year when UDMR joined in governing).

¹⁰⁵ Marian Chiriac, *Provocările diversității. Politici publice privind minoritățile naționale și religioase în România*, Fundația CRDE, Cluj-Napoca, 2005, p. 101



a. Tendencies and major changes: 100 years after the outbreak of World War I

On the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I, on ethno-linguistic composition of the population in this region we recorded the following:

- The disappearance of almost absolute majority of Jews and Germans
- The Romanization, especially of the urban settlements (the phenomenon began in the interwar period with the establishment of the Romanian government in cities that needed a true and Romanian-speaking elite)
- Continuous magyarization of Swabians, Slovaks and Roma (the phenomenon is favored by religious affinities, and language - mostly these communities were Magyarized before 1918)
- From a linguistic point of view, after nearly a century, the major change is given by the following fact: in 1918 Hungarian was known by most Romanians, a small share of Hungarians knowing Romanian; in 2023 Romanian is known by most Hungarians and only a small proportion of Romanians speak Hungarian.
- Education and religion appear to be exponents of Hungarian ethnic identity. This process is achieved through the traditional Calvinist Protestant Church (Reformed) and recently more and more by the Roman Catholic Church (the latter in the area of Oradea was seen by Protestant Hungarian nobility in the eighteenth century as an Habsburg imperialist tool, later, however, in order to attract the Hungarian community, it entered into competition with the Hungarian Protestant churches taking the Hungarian ethno-cultural message and identity).
- Discrimination and stigmatization of the Roma. These took effect as 'reducing' the community in official documents due to self-identification with other ethnic groups. The effect of this phenomenon is not just recording a smaller number of Roma in official documents, but also artificially raising the numbers of Hungarians in documents. This was at a larger scale during the communist period but it began to decrease during the last two decades.
- Increasing the Roma community both in number and as a percentage of the population. Underlying this trend: high birth rates among this community (however, the phenomenon is associated with other demographic realities: high mortality and low life expectancy in the community) and a higher percentage of those who identify themselves with their ethnic group. This latter aspect is related to strengthening communities, their identity consciousness, the formation of an own elite more present in public sphere, and not least reducing discrimination and stigma effects which are still present.

b. Legislative and institutional framework for protection of national and confessional minorities

The Romanian legal framework guarantees equal protection for all citizens and punishes discrimination, ensures full and effective equality before the law for all citizens of Romania, includes provisions to combat discrimination and xenophobia, guarantees linguistic rights, education in the mother tongue, but also *limited officialdom* - in the administrative units where the percentage of the linguistic minority equals or exceeds 20%. Representation of minorities in Parliament is provided for in the Constitution.

In the context of the issuance of more than 200 laws regulating "in various fields, the rights of national minorities and the framework for ensuring and preservation of linguistic and



cultural identity of their members,”¹⁰⁶ one can identify a real concern of the Romanian authorities for improving the situation of minorities, whether ethnic or confessional¹⁰⁷; the problematic aspect of these measures is, on the one hand, the manner of implementation (in particular the inefficiency of existing legal instruments and, simultaneously, their insufficient number) and, on the other hand, the need to review the contents of some of these acts in consequence of elusion, at the level of the recipient, other than the Hungarian and Roma minorities.

We will proceed to list the main rights that the members of national minorities particularly have¹⁰⁸, rights that come to add the rights guaranteed by the Romanian Constitution and the Framework Conventions on human rights and fundamental freedoms, of all Romanian citizens: the right to non-discrimination in exercising a legitimate right, the right to use the mother tongue in relations with the administration, within the judicial system, within public and private relations, as well as the right to study in their native language, the right of free political association and representation in the Parliament.¹⁰⁹

The main institutions active in the segment of national minority rights that promote good interethnic relations and fight anti-discrimination are: the Department for Interethnic Relations (DRI) which cooperates with the Council of National Minorities (the latter brings together three representatives of national minorities represented in Romanian Parliament), the National Agency for Roma (ANR), Institute for Research on National Minorities (SPMN), National Council for Combating Discrimination (CNCD), the People’s Advocate, together with the ministries that have departments for minority issues.¹¹⁰ The minorities institutions, totalling 1804 units¹¹¹, with predominant activity within culture, protection / promotion of human rights, education / science and religion¹¹² actively contribute to the formation of an overview of civil and social engagement of minority communities; we will not try to fight the case examples given by the jurisprudence for the violation of minorities rights, especially on instances of

¹⁰⁶ In accordance with the information provided by the programme CRDE *Baze de date – Acte normative privind drepturile și protecția minorităților naționale în România*, coordinated by Gabor Adam, http://www.edrc.ro/projects.jsp?project_id=53 (last accessed on 16.01.2023)

¹⁰⁷ The Constitution of Romania, art. 29 (3): All religions shall be free and organized in accordance with their own statutes, under the terms laid down by law; and (5): Religious cults shall be autonomous from the State and shall enjoy support from it, including the facilitation of religious assistance in the army, in hospitals, prisons, homes and orphanages.

¹⁰⁸ Radu Chiriță, Anca Săndescu, “Analiza actelor normative privind drepturile minorităților în România” în Levente Salat (ed.), *Politici de integrare a minorităților naționale din România. Aspecte legale și instituționale într-o perspectivă comparată*, Fundația CRDE, Cluj-Napoca, 2008, p. 119

¹⁰⁹ According to the Constitution of Romania, art. 62, para. 2: “Organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities, which fail to obtain the number of votes for representation in Parliament, have the right to one Deputy seat each, under the terms of the electoral law. Citizens of a national minority are entitled to be represented by one organization only.” In addition, there is a requirement for obtaining a number of votes equal to at least 5% of the average number of votes validly expressed for election of a Deputy (Law for electing the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate no. 68/992).

¹¹⁰ Dalma Janosi, “Cadru instituțional privind protecția minorităților naționale din România” în Levente Salat, (ed.), *Politici de integrare a minorităților naționale din România. Aspecte legale și instituționale într-o perspectivă comparată*, Fundația CRDE, Cluj-Napoca, 2008

¹¹¹ In accordance with the data supplied by the Institute for Research on National Minorities

¹¹² Kiss Denes, *Sistemul instituțional al minorităților din România*, Workshop Studies, Research of national minorities in Romania



property return in cases of religious cults in Romania, but to the extent that such activities are not only promoted, but also financed (limited, it is true, and often insufficiently). We can say that the Romanian state has committed, indeed, to provide a framework for the development of intercultural dialogue, stating that the enforcement of norms continues to be poor, either because the authorities do not fully respect them, or because of existing uncertainties in both the body of law and the powers established for the various institutional structures.

c. Critical approach of the Romanian model of interethnic relations

Amendments to the Constitution, electoral law, restitution of property belonging to organizations or individuals, reforms in education and in local government, and other initiatives of the Romanian State are clear landmarks for its receptivity in relation to the claims of various ethnic groups (in this case, the Hungarian fraction), but typical manifestations of a dominant culture, constructed and reproduced in the nation-state logic (justified by the imperatives of stability required from the international community) have never ceased to manifest themselves, the time that has passed in the rigors of the post-December new societal model only contributes to refining them and to give them more clear meaning.

The regime of national minorities rights in Romania and, simultaneously, of confessional rights, is regulated by a series of laws aimed at (in the subsidiary of its stated objectives) a harmonization (mandatory, in fact) with the laws of supranational structures, namely the European Union, which Romania joined. Without disregarding the moral value of such initiatives it should be noted that the inefficiency of the implemented framework arises from the haste introduction of laws setting out general non-discrimination clauses and provisions on minority rights aimed more at the agreement and appreciation of those structures to which the Romanian state joined than the actual welfare of the categories concerned.

In a study carried out by Radu Chiriță and Anca Săndescu on the existing normative acts, as well as on the implementation mechanisms, the authors say: “even though, unlike other areas of study, the internal legal framework does not know contradictions between several legislative provisions, and the international legal provisions have been transposed into national law with much fidelity, the established legal system fails to create the necessary legal instruments to ensure full compliance with the rights enjoyed by members of national minority communities.”¹¹³. As it was reiterated in the conclusions of many studies on minority issues (e.g. Marian Chiriac, *op. cit.*), the absence of a law specifically defining the status of national minorities in Romania is a major impediment in developing a legal framework to reproduce ethno-political legitimacy for non-dominant cultures without direct prejudice or compromise of the state’s efforts to increase the degree of internal cohesion. In this respect, Kelemen Hunor, leader of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, launched the call for the reintroduction on the party’s political agenda for 2012 the draft Law on national minorities, which would provide new perspectives for the development of interethnic relations in Romania.

The method of positive discrimination, noted in the access to the Parliament granted to minorities, also has a number of shortcomings caused mainly by falsely assuming a minority identity in order to get a political seat, or by accepting one political organization as an exponent of the entire minorities community (result of a hostile attitude against minority political

¹¹³ Radu Chiriță, Anca Săndescu, *op. cit.*, p. 121



pluralism).¹¹⁴ The institutional framework implemented in order to protect national minorities in Romania shows the same deficiencies identifiable also in the measures of the legislative nature applied by Romanian authorities. Beyond the technical issues that these structures have been facing, often cumulated to the lack of infrastructure or human resources, there is also a communication problem that occurs at both inter- and intra-institutional levels, and especially regarding the visibility of these organizations, not so much among relevant civil society, but especially among unaffiliated minorities.

Furthermore, relating to the degree of organization, both social and political, there is an obvious disproportion generated, most likely, by the tradition that has shaped these minorities and by the number of each minority members. Perception of own needs, together with an unequal apparatus to fight discrimination, have generated the assumption of a completely separate development for different ethnic groups in Romania. If Hungarians display a claiming attitude based on real structures to combat discrimination, the Roma minority, for example, the second large minority in Romania, despite the many political organizations established to defend its interests, fails to build a model for addressing their issues in a unified, coherent and reasoned manner. On the other hand, the general pushing to the periphery of minorities against the majority population, namely Romanians, sometimes triggers claim-release from any minority group of any political connotation, the affirmation of national identity being based wholly on reproduction within the community of specific forms of cultural tradition; this is the case of small minorities in Romania. At this level, the institutional mechanism should promote, in a more active, more participatory manner, the idea of intercultural communion, the multicultural education being a decisive factor for achieving the desired degree of complementarity for the modern cultural and societal political project of post-totalitarian Romania.

The Romanian society in post-communist period was deeply influenced by the changes made by removing the totalitarian communist regime. National minorities are in a different rapport with the majority. Modernization and post-communist democratization have been linked to this process of assuming a new model for managing inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations to assume a correct relation between the majority community (Romanian / Orthodox) and the minority communities. In this context, the legislation on the rights of minorities has experienced a renewal process to allow alignment to the standards required and imposed by the European integration process, and also to reach that level of attaining the full spectrum of human rights in Romania. Despite this legal framework, considered to be one ideal, Romania still has pending problems whose solutions are expected to clear the future. Challenges and prospects of building a multicultural society require priority on finding solutions to some of the

¹¹⁴ In this light, Lucian Nastasă, Levente Salat, *op. cit.*, p. 13: “On the other hand, we should not overlook the fact that [...] the cardinal elements of the Romanian model - representation of minorities in Parliament, the existence of a Council of National Minorities or the very presence of representatives of one of the major minorities in the government – do not automatically solve all problems. [...] The dialogic framework should be maintained with care and beyond, so that the presence of representatives of minorities in these structures would not remain a formal presence, invoked in times of balance, but a real participation, effective and efficient in those decisions relating to destinies of the communities which they represent.”



most striking and topical issues of inter-ethnic relations management: the discrimination against the Roma population and the dispute over the granting of a form of autonomy from the central regions for the Hungarian community. Reducing discrimination against Roma is proving to be a European challenge not only Romanian one. That, and finding compromise solutions regarding the issue of local autonomy are subjects of debate requiring increased attention from both the Romanian authorities and the civil society.

In what concerns the education for and about national minorities it must be concluded that there is great need to develop a legal and institutional framework to enable and promote an intercultural education system. National minorities should not only be able to express themselves freely and without any restrictions from the majority by adequate education, but their specific characteristics and particularities should be included in school curricula of the majority.



4. IDENTITY, INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY. CASE STUDY: REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

4.1. Identity realities in the Republic of Moldova¹¹⁵

Without proposing to analyze the full spectrum of identity in Moldova, during this study we wish to identify *possible identity cleavages* that shape the borders of identity.

Our *hypothesis* is that in this state there are realities that converge towards the daily expression of community and identity frontiers. These frontiers can be identified both in terms of ethno-national identity, and in terms of religious identity. In both situations the political and geopolitical implications are very important and acquire the value of critical factors in the development of identity.

Methodologically, we mention that during this study we do not aim to resolve fundamental issues in any way, nor to clarify possible existential dilemmas of identity or controversy, older or newer. Our *objectives* are to analyze possible identity realities that can generate at the societal level some cleavages which take the form of identity borders. As such, our debate is geared towards *identifying* these borders, to argue them through the possible cleavage they produce. The fact remains that in our assumption, the existence of a border identity does not necessarily mean a dislodging, a discontinuity, but can be interpreted as a contact area for cultural identity. Such contact area can generate not only a multicultural expression but also the development of an intercultural society in which cleavages fade.

During this analysis, we propose a *general discussion on issues of identity*, often of great sensitivity in the area of the Republic of Moldova. As it is understandable, such an analysis could stir emotions born of latent manifestations in the public space. From the beginning, we highlight the fact that we do not intend to find truths or answers, but to identify possible identity borders. We do not wish to position ourselves on one side or another of the debates (the existence of identity borders requires the presence of at least two identity construction that meet, often located at opposite ends!).

Each of the general themes identified as generators of identity borders/frontiers have constituted in themselves fundamental thesis that require complex analyses, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

a. National identity, or about being Moldovan

A controversy arises, like the case of Macedonia, in regard to the very name of the state east of the Prut. The Principality of Moldova, by the Treaty of Bucharest between the Ottoman and Tsarist Empires lost the east bank of the Prut. After this date the state continued to exist only in the west of the river, and then by uniting with the Romanian Country (1859) that statehood was transferred to the Romanian state.

¹¹⁵ This text was developed and revised based on the study Mircea Brie, *Identity as Frontier in Central and Eastern Europe. The Case of the Republic of Moldova*, în Mircea Brie, Alina Stoica, Florentina Chirodea (coord.), *The European Space Borders and Issues. In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga*, Editura Universității din Oradea/Debrecen University Press, Oradea/Debrecen, 2016, p. 359-381.



The territory between the Prut and the Dniester, called Bessarabia (indeed, more by the Romanians from Romania) recorded several steps in the period following the Russian annexation: 1. till 1918, belonging to the Tsarist Empire; 2. the period from 1918-1940, when Bessarabia was part of the Greater Romania; 3. period 1940-1991, the Soviet period; 4. aftermath of the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Moldova.

The symbolism of the Moldovan statehood, despite the more recent rhetoric, goes back to a glorious early Middle Ages of the first Moldavian rulers (claimed to be Romanian by the Principality of Moldova which was not occupied by the Russians in 1812).

Being Moldovan, as an identity construct, has brought many polemics and controversies regardless of where it was viewed and analyzed. But it was used each time for political or geopolitical reasons. The controversy lacks clarification at home, without having to extend this debate in other geographical areas whose geopolitical interests do not converge towards the same goals. The *Moldovenism* versus *Romanianism* debate has ignited spirits east of the Prut often fueled more or less from the west to the east. The two perspectives seem to be diametrically opposed. The Romanian perspective includes the Moldovans together with Transylvanian, Oltenians, Muntenians, among Romanians (being Moldavian is not an ethno-national-linguistic identity, but a regional and geographical one!). The Moldovenism perspective excludes the common identity, of nation and language, or any superimposed identity like the Bavarians are Germans, and Germans are Europeans (to be Moldovan means de facto not to be Romanian and viceversa!).

Without much importance that moldovenism was created and fed by the Tsarist or Soviet partisans, it massively served the political interests of the government from Chisinau after the proclamation of independence.

Initially it tried to create a nation-state in which the Romanian language was recognized as the official language and the doctrine of “one nation, two states” was officially accepted by both sides of the Prut. The national minorities, with intense external support reconciled hard with this reality and reacted. “Imaginary dangers” of the union between the young Moldovan state with Romania and discrimination according to ethnic or linguistic criteria generated the beginning of a dual secession process in the eastern and southern regions of the republic, a process that culminated in the outbreak of armed conflict on the left bank of the Dniester”¹¹⁶.

The Moldovan President Mircea Snegur officially renounce this doctrine on 29 July 1994 with the adoption of the new Constitution¹¹⁷. The thesis regarding the Moldovan identity, different from the Romanian identity, is repeated and amplified. Used by Tsarist and Soviet partisans to justify separation from the Romanian state, now it serves political interests that talk about national interest, namely preserving the Moldovan statehood that would be threatened.

In theory, the moldovenism as identity construct is used in the sense of developing a national identity of civic-related citizen. Its new identity aims to pull together all Moldovan citizens regardless of their ethno-national or linguistic options.

¹¹⁶ Radj Cărbune, *Identitatea națională a Republicii Moldova*, <https://radjcarbune.wordpress.com/2010/12/02/identitatea-nationala-a-republicii-moldova/>, accessed in November 8, 2022.

¹¹⁷ See the text of the new Constitution adopted by the Moldovan state in 1994, <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/mo/md/md046mo.pdf>, accessed in November 10, 2022.



Even if the new authorities who took power in Chisinau from the Communists after 2008 changed the logic of argument identity, the moldovenism remains a factor that generates controversy. While some Moldovans proclaim their ethno-national identity and language to be Romanian, others with minorities present in this space, support the moldovenism, as distinct from the Romanian identity which they see as a threat of undermining the Moldovan statehood. So, in one country, the Republic of Moldova, we talk about Romanian Moldovans and the Moldovan Moldovans.

b. The Romanian language versus the Moldovan language

This controversy hinges on promoting the moldovenism as identity. The Moldovan language, as a language distinct from the Romanian language, serves the same political or geopolitical interests and objectives. Whatever the origin of this dispute, the Moldovan society is divided not only in relation to linguistic minorities, but also in relation to the language options of the ethno-national majority group.

The process of Russification of the tsarist and soviet periods was served by the implementation of the doctrine of two different languages: “Romanian” and “Moldovan”. Imperial multinational states, they in turn pointed fingers at the Romanian “imperialism” on to other people: the Moldovan people speaking another language, the Moldovan language.

The Moldovan Declaration of Independence (1991)¹¹⁸ makes clear reference to the “establishment of Romanian as a state language”, language that Moldovans used it and felt that it was identical to theirs.

For reasons explained briefly above, promoting the Moldovenism has become the official policy of the Chisinau authorities after 1994, deepening the confusion and controversy. The official language of Moldova is according to the new constitution, the “Moldovan language” in Latin script¹¹⁹.

The contradiction has continued despite the attempts made by the new government to restore the rights of the Romanian language as the official language.

Only on 5 December 2013, the Constitutional Court of Moldova solved this dilemma and interminable dispute regarding the official language. Judges, in discussing the text of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution decided that the text of the document take precedence over the Constitution and “the state language of Moldova is Romanian”. “The Declaration of Independence is the legal and political fundamental of the Constitution so that no provision of the latter can exceed the Declaration of Independence. The Court concluded that, in case of divergence between the text of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the constitutional text of the Declaration of Independence primarily prevail. The decision is final and can not be subject to any appeal”, according to the president of the Constitutional Court, Alexandru Tanase¹²⁰.

¹¹⁸ See the text of Law no. 691 from 27.08.1991 on the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova, http://istoria.md/articol/573/Declara%C5%A3ia_de_Independen%C5%A3%C4%83_a_Republicii_Moldova, accessed in November 10, 2016.

¹¹⁹ *Constituția Republicii Moldova din 29.07.1994*, art. 13.

¹²⁰ *Curtea Constituțională: limba de stat a Republicii Moldova este limba română*, în *Timpul.md*, 5 decembrie 2014, <http://www.timpul.md/articol/curtea-constituionala-limba-de-stat-a-republicii-moldova-este-limba-romana-67053.html>, accesat în data de 10 noiembrie 2022.



Beyond the intervention of the Constitutional Court, controversy and disputes regarding the Moldovan identity are able to perpetuate this symbolic border, often used for ideological purposes.

c. Being a Romanian in the Republic of Moldova

Identifying an individual in Moldova as “Romanian” requires some nuances. Specificity given by the realities of this country make this identification to highlight several categories of “Romanians”.

The dispute between Moldovans and Romanians is based on the need to find an identity for residents east of the Prut. They are Moldovan citizens naturally. But there are ethno-national Romanian? Who are those who declare themselves to be Romanian? Naturally for many of them to identify as Romanian does not conflict with their status as Moldovan (civic identity, regional and geographic identity and so on).

We identify at least for categories of “Romanians” in Moldova:

a. those born in Romania, Romanian citizens or not, who have chosen to settle in this state for various reasons but preserve their identity as Romanians

b. those of Moldovan citizens who believe they are ethno-linguistic Romanians and asked for Romanian citizenship (the Romanian state has encouraged and promoted in the last decade the policy of granting dual citizenship to Moldovans)

c. those of Moldovan citizens who believe they are ethno-linguistic Romanian, but have not the Romanian citizenship (did not ask for it or did not get it!)

d. Moldovans who have received Romanian citizenship, although they identify as something other than Romanians (in this case to obtain Romanian passports has rather a socio-material motivation).

For a long time, long after the declaration of independence, a person declaring themselves Romanian may have been classified as unionist and as someone who attempted to destroy Moldova’s statehood.

Then, being Romanian was not being part of an elitist group that represents power, a group that is extending a state’s grand power. Instead, there are many nostalgic imperialist dating back to the Soviet era, when Moldova - always called “the poorest European state”, was part of a global superpower.

The subject is broader and more complex. The Moldovan citizens’ opinions are often able to give way to disputes and controversies regarding identity. During the documentation for this study we have had the opportunity to read various reviews posted on various forums to which we have access today thanks to globalization. For a better understanding of the nuances that we do not afford to analyze during this study, we recommend a forum where Moldovans were called to answer the question “Why are we not Romanian?” where there are over 2,300 comments pro and con to Moldovenism / Romanianism¹²¹.

d. Being a Russian in the Republic of Moldova

The Russian community in Moldova was formed and developed in the years following the Treaty of Bucharest with the Moldovan territory east of the Prut being annexed by and to the Tsarist Empire. From just a few thousand in 1820, the Russian community had grown to

¹²¹ <http://www.moldovenii.md/md/forum/posts/topic/179/page/1>, accesat în data de 10 noiembrie 2022.



over 550,000 members in 1989, for a later decrease mainly due to migration to the Russian Federation. The census from 2004¹²² (the latest made public) recorded the presence of a number of 201,218 Russians in Moldova (5.9% of total population), not including Transnistria (with the Russians here, this community adds up to 369,896, representing 9.4% of the population). This community, where the natives declared themselves Moldovan (with some declaring themselves Romanians) and Ukrainian, is the third in size and weights.

The Russian community became increasingly influential during the Soviet period, favored by Moscow's policies, including the "transfer" of people from one side to another of the USSR. Newcomers to Moldova, many originating from various Soviet republics had in common with the others the Russian language, which in time they adopted as their mother tongue. Most of them identified themselves as Russians.

The Russian language was a swinging factor in the identity in Moldova.

Moreover, the phenomenon is still ongoing. Many individuals who have declared Moldovan nationality (63,290 people) and Ukrainians (89,853 people), even Romanian (571 people) chose Russian as their mother tongue¹²³.

Russian is selected as the mother tongue of 380,796 people while the Russian nationality was chosen by only 201,218 people¹²⁴. A significant difference between those who declare themselves Russians and those who choose Russian as their mother tongue -- that is without counting the fact that a large share of the population (Moldovans, Ukrainians, etc.) currently use Russian in everyday life.

Our debate is not about the Russian language, but about being Russian in Moldova. The Russian language made many of them feel like they have Russian identity.

The Russian minority in Moldova, as well as other former Soviet states was not like other minorities. Collective mind, various templates and stereotypes often lead us to position some communities on higher pedestals compared to other groups. The Russian community has benefited greatly from the fact that it was not only a minority, but the extension of a majority, more or less discontinued.

This was and is an extension of power, of a symbolism, an imperial voice, an identity considered superior even through the privileged position that was fortunate enough to occupy. Or, all peripheral and marginal communities have always been tempted to aspire to a better societal position. See the case of the Gagauz, but also of the Ukrainians (the latter despite the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine) which, under the influence of the Russian media obviously tend towards an approach to Russian identity.

Trends have not been recorded in only one direction, many Russians accept the realities of the last quarter century or new statehood, the new language etc.

¹²² Biroul Național de Statistică al Republicii Moldova, *Recensământul Populației 2004*, <http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=295&id=2234>, accesat în data de 11 noiembrie 2022.

¹²³ *Ibidem*

¹²⁴ *Ibidem*



e. Orthodoxy in the Republic of Moldova: between Bucharest and Moscow

*The law on freedom of conscience, thought and religion*¹²⁵ provision preserves the old religion law in Moldova, which makes the state to register any religious organization that has at least 100 members. This reality has led to the emergence of parallel Orthodox religious organizations, each claiming their authenticity and legitimacy. We do not intend on this occasion to discuss those “autocephalous” communities which have a small number of parishioners¹²⁶, but we would like to bring forth the largest:

- the Moldovan Orthodox Church (also called “Moldovan Orthodox Church”), affiliated to the Moscow Patriarchate

- the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Exarchate realms, independent church, part of the Romanian Patriarchate

The former, with most parishioners registered in Moldova in 1993 is claimed to be the successor of the Diocese of Chisinau founded in 1812 by the Russian Church¹²⁷.

The latter is declared successor to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia which existed between 1918 / 1924-1940 and 1941-1943, heir to the Romanian Orthodoxy that existed in Bessarabia from start till 1812¹²⁸.

The two churches often challenged themselves, while maintaining strained relations which were transmitted down to the parishioners. Moreover, this organization has reflected geopolitical trends from Moscow and Bucharest. In Moldova, the two churches bore the banners of a fight that the two patriarchs do not allow them to show.

f. The Gagauz community - an identity on the border

An issue of a high sensitivity in Moldova is the Gagauz community. Beyond their controversial origin, their identity carries over significant nuances of historical stages which marked their existence. Increasingly this community identity was transformed into what today is a russo-oriented community, systematically supported by Moscow.

Without being very large (according to the 2004 census, the community had 147,500 members, of whom 127,835 were living in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia¹²⁹), this community is distinguished by the importance that had in the history of Bessarabia.

The most accepted theory concerning their origin is that they are descendants of Turkic tribes, or even possible Oghuzii Seljuks. Other historians speak of Cuman origin, Peceneg or

¹²⁵ Law No. 125 din 11.05.2007, *Legea privind libertatea de conștiință, gândire și de religie*, published in 17.08.2007 in Monitorul Oficial nr. 127-130, art. 546, available at <http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view&view=doc&id=324889&lang=1>, accessed in 11.11.2022.

¹²⁶ The website ortodoxia.md, which introduces themselves as “an orthodox community” from the Republic of Moldova, in the study *Câte biserici ortodoxe avem în moldova?*, <http://www.ortodoxia.md/2011/04/cate-biserici-ortodoxe-avem-in-moldova/>, accessed in 10.11.2022, identifies 5 parallel jurisdictions which each pretend to be canonical. to them it also adds the cultul religios ortodox pe stil vechi din republica moldova (old style orthodox religious cult in moldova).

¹²⁷ See the official website: <http://mitropolia.md/>.

¹²⁸ For more details of its history, we recommend the documentary material prepared by Stelian Gomboș regarding the Romanian Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia, <http://www.crestinortodox.ro/religie/mitropolia-ortodoxa-romana-basarabiei-122930.html>, accessed in 11.11.2022.

¹²⁹ Biroul Național de Statistică al Republicii Moldova, *Recensământul Populației 2004*, <http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=295&id=2234>, accessed in 16.11.2022.



Bulgarian¹³⁰. Of certainty are their still Turkish origin of their language and the fact that they were Christianized, giving up Islam under the influence of Byzantium¹³¹. Their presence in Bessarabia space is linked to the migration from Bulgaria to Dobrogea and Bessarabia areas at the end of the eighteenth century. The annexation of Bessarabia by the tsarists and their transformation in their dispute often with the Turks but also for the control of the new province, turned them into the Orthodox Christian allies increasingly willing to accept cultural and political proximity. In turn, the Russians granted them privileges, exemptions from taxes and military service and so on¹³². The Soviet period drew them closer to the Russian identity because the Russian language is now assumed collectively. After gaining state independence by the Republic of Moldova, the Gagauz along with other minorities have campaigned for the creation of an autonomous region of Gagauzia, culturally backed by Ankara which opened here a Turkish Cultural Center and Turkish Library.

All this transforms this community into a border identity, into one of contact between culture and identity.

In addition, Moldova faces and the so-called Transnistrian crisis. Tiraspol officials are also involved in a process of constructing an identity, also on the border.

Identity dilemmas and controversies in Moldova, as well as others in the area of Central and Eastern are determined / fueled by geopolitical interests of some states / powers they have used for purposes of extending or maintaining influences.

Identities, only occasionally were able to establish divisions in the true sense of the term. Borders were given identity or symbolic form of ideological frontiers.

4.2. Analysis of the Republic of Moldova's relationship with the European Union in light of the Eastern Partnership Index¹³³

4.2.1. Introduction & methodology

Despite the fact that the Eastern Partnership (EaP) project is often viewed as having an integrative role in light of its proximity to the European Union, its evolution has been sinuous, mired by shifting geopolitical contexts and divergent national aspirations consistent with the assumed objectives. In terms of evolution and geopolitical context, the EaP has seen numerous reformatory changes, as well as adaptations that took into account the level of individual aspirations of the states¹³⁴.

¹³⁰ The Bulgarian historians consider them as simple Turkish Bulgarian who maintained their religious identity as Orthodox Christian, <https://romaniabreakingnews.ro/cine-sunt-de-fapt-gagauzi-cei-folositi-azi-de-rusia-pe-post-de-unealta-geostrategica-si-amenintare-permanenta-la-adresa-suveranitati-integritatii-teritoriale-a-r-moldova/>, accessed in 16.11.2022.

¹³¹ Nicu Pârlog, *Găgăuzii: rădăciți prin istorie*, <http://www.descopera.ro/cultura/9145873-gagauzii-rataciti-prin-istorie>, accessed in 16.11.2022

¹³² *Ibidem*.

¹³³ This text was published as a paper Mircea Brie, *Analysis of the Republic of Moldova's relationship with the European Union in light of the Eastern Partnership Index*, in *Analele Universității din Oradea, Seria Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene*, XIV, 2022, p. 59 – 78.

¹³⁴ Brie, Mircea (2022), *Eșecul actualului model al Parteneriatului Estic. De la complicatele interese naționale la contextualizarea geopolitică*, Ioan Bolovan, Melania-Gabriela Ciot (coord.), *Românii și România în context*



The purpose of this research is to analyze the EaP Index in order to evaluate the positive course of the Republic of Moldova within the EaP, by developing relations with the EU and deepening European integration. The effect of the geopolitical context on the evolution of the relationship between Moldova and the EU is also being pursued.

Methodologically, we aim to analyze some of the indicators quantified in the Eastern Partnership Index during the period 2011-2021. We intend to identify the integrator level in three relevant measurable areas (and a couple of subareas): Management, Approximation and Linkage.

We propose the following levels of analysis from a methodological standpoint: a. Contextualizing the RM's involvement in the EaP; b. Analyzing the EaP Index and identifying integrator levels; and c. Generating an inductive response regarding the RM's European path.

The main research questions raised are: 1. Was the Republic's acquisition of the status of candidate state for the European Union determined by the progress and development of relations with the European Union or was it the result of the geopolitical context after the beginning of the Russian aggression in Ukraine in February 2022? 2. Does the analysis of the EaP Index highlight the development of the Republic of Moldova's integrative process in the European structures?

In order to identify and analyze the progress made by the Republic of Moldova in areas such as economy, security, rule of law, interconnectivity, mobility, etc., the EaP Index was used.

The Index was launched two years after the launch of the Partnership and contains aggregate statistics on the level of integration of the six above-mentioned countries. European integration for the EaP states is understood as a sum of the elements that comprise the political, economic, civil and security dimension. It is measured by: the level of convergence with European norms, the level of economic exchanges and the increase of these exchanges, the development and deepening of cross-border networks and people contact¹³⁵.

The present analysis includes aggregated data from 2011 to 2021. It should be noted that from 2011 to 2014 the index was officially called the European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership states. The name was changed in 2015 to the Eastern Partnership Index. The change was not accidental, as we will see in the subsequent analysis. If in the case of the former, the emphasis was on integration based on the premise that all six partner states want a deep relationship with the EU, if not accession, in the case of the latter the tone is more nuanced/adapted, taking into account the interests of partner countries.

The Index uses a multi-layered methodology¹³⁶. "It involved over 50 experts from all EaP states at each and every stage, namely in the basic research design, data gathering, quantitative and qualitative analysis and verification. As a first step, national experts completed

European. Istorie și diplomatie: Omagiu profesorului Vasile Pușcaș la împlinirea vârstei de 70 de ani, Editura Academia Română, Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj-Napoca, p. 316

¹³⁵ EaP-CSF (2022a), Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, "What is EaP Index?", available at: <https://eap-csf.eu/what-is-eap-index/>, accessed 04.12.2022.

¹³⁶ Most survey questions ask for a "Yes" or "No" response to induce experts to take a clear position and to minimise misclassification errors. As a rule, all questions to be answered with yes or no by the country experts are coded 1 = yes or positive with regard, for example, to EU integration and convergence, and 0 = negative with regard to integration and convergence (labelled "1-0"). If the expert comments and consultations with experts suggest intermediate scores, such assessments are coded as 0.5 (EaP-CSF, 2022b).



a questionnaire by giving scores for their countries against a detailed set of indicators, which formed the basis of subsequent national reports, drafted by the experts. These reports were then analysed by sectoral experts, also from the EaP region, who synthesised national-level findings into a wider regional perspective. Fourteen focus groups based on the sectoral reports were then held and provided an opportunity for all experts and the Index editorial team to collectively probe, discuss and validate the findings, whilst also identifying salient case studies. Through its methodological approach, the Index strikes an effective balance between richness and rigour and yields evidence, lessons learned and examples of best practice of use for EaP and EU stakeholders. The Index's method also means that progress and change can be gleaned on a comparative cross-regional basis, meaning that instances of progress, backsliding and inertia and where relevant, frontrunners, can be identified¹³⁷.

For a clear methodological overview of our analysis, we make the following clarifications¹³⁸:

- The analysis of the management dimension gives us an image of only four time intervals (2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014), which is then analyzed as part of the other two dimensions of the PAE Index.

- Linkage dimension, was last measured and published for the interval 2018-2019 (in this case we have data available for seven time intervals: 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015-2016, 2017 and 2018-2019).

- Approximation dimension has been quantified for seven time intervals: 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015-2016, 2017 and 2020-2021

4.2.2. EaP context

Despite some obvious progress since its launch in 2009, the EaP has reached its limits. The current format, despite regular reform attempts, does not provide a framework for development or clear perspectives on their relations with the EU. The multilateral framework has been replaced by a bilateral one. The EU has sought to stimulate the EaP countries to engage in an integrative process, benefiting from a deep level of ambition in achieving the integration targets. The more-for-more principle has led to increased European support (including through consistent additional financial allocations) for countries that have chosen to approach the EU. However, these countries were limited by the lack of a strong EU commitment to setting an accession timetable. Faced with geopolitical challenges, faced with Russian pressures and threats, the EaP states have often had to nuance their views, putting the specific national interests in the foreground.

Given the complex realities and numerous conflicts in its neighborhood, ranging from North Africa to the Near East to Ukraine, the EU is forced to reinvent itself at the level of neighborhood-specific policies. The goal of creating a good neighborhood space appears not to be reached, serving as a smoke screen in front of potential competition from other actors. The EaP format is no different. It is critical to redefine logic, purpose, and tools. Brussels must demonstrate firmness as well as a clear political and geopolitical vision.

A general and easily identifiable conclusion (perhaps superficial!) From many perspectives, it is that the EaP as an initiative of the European Union is a failure. Belarus has

¹³⁷ *Ibidem*

¹³⁸ *Ibidem*



withdrawn from the partnership. Ukraine must prepare for a Russian invasion. Armenia and Azerbaijan continue the tense episodes of their sinuous path of conflicting bilateral relations caused by the failure to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh problems. Georgia and the Republic of Moldova are directly threatened by the Russian-Ukrainian war and must pay much closer attention to Russia-backed separatist republics on their territory¹³⁹.

The diachronic analysis must take into account the fact that the European Union's perspective on its relations with neighboring states is based on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This policy, which was initiated in 2003 and officially launched in May 2004 (ENP, 2004), was designed to "avoid the emergence of new lines of separation" between the EU and its neighbors¹⁴⁰. The ENP and EaP were components of a strategy that the European Union attempted to implement in order to achieve balance and understanding along its eastern borders. Over the last few decades, not only the European Union, but also its neighbors, have worked to establish mutually beneficial cooperation relationships. "These have taken the shape of asymmetrical alliances based on partnerships and cooperative agreements. Later, Eastern countries developed deeper relations, progressing from these agreements to a new level of partnership, eventually leading to their accession to the EU."¹⁴¹ The ENP and EaP appeared to be part of a broader, integrative policy. Even the three states that signed the Association agreements and unequivocally declared their support for European integration did not receive clear perspectives on a potential member state status prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. At the beginning of March 2022, amid the precipitous events generated by the Russian aggression, the European institutions started the process for examining the applications for EU membership made by the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia.

The European Council granted Moldova and Ukraine the designation of candidate nations on June 23, 2022. The European Council also said on the same day that it was ready to grant Georgia candidate status as soon as the priorities indicated in the European Commission's opinion on Georgia's accession application were addressed (issued on 17 June 2022)¹⁴².

Despite these prompt actions, which are crucial from a political and image standpoint, the European Union is compelled to quickly modify its policies in the Eastern Neighbourhood. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict's trajectory and, more importantly, how it is resolved (in time and form!) will determine the extent of the expansion to the east. However, the EU cannot afford to forsake its allies, to whom it can only provide a few limited solutions in the geopolitical environment of 2022.

¹³⁹ Brie, Mircea (2022), *Eșecul actualului model al Parteneriatului Estic. De la complicatele interese naționale la contextualizarea geopolitică*, Ioan Bolovan, Melania-Gabriela Ciot (coord.), *Românii și România în context European. Istorie și diplomatie: Omagiu profesorului Vasile Pușcaș la împlinirea vârstei de 70 de ani*, Editura Academia Română, Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj-Napoca, p. 326

¹⁴⁰ Pop, Adrian Gabriela Pascariu, George Anglițoiu, Alexandru Purcăruș (2005), *România și Republica Moldova – între Politica Europeană de Vecinătate și perspectiva extinderii Uniunii Europene*, Institutul European din România – Studii de impact III, p. 8, http://www.ier.ro/sites/default/files/pdf/Pais3_studiu_5_ro.pdf, accessed 10.12.2022.

¹⁴¹ Bărbulescu, I. Gh. (coord.), Brie, Mircea, Toderăș N. (2016), *Cooperarea transfrontalieră între România și Ucraina, respectiv între România și Republica Moldova. Oportunități și provocări între 2014-2020*, Tritonic, București, p. 75

¹⁴² European Council (2022), *EU enlargement policy*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/>, accessed 10.12.2022.



Through an analysis of policies, context and results, we identify the current EaP boundaries in three main directions, without excluding other perspectives¹⁴³:

- The limits of the EU's low commitment to the integration of EaP states
- The general geopolitical context and the Russian opposition in particular
- Specific national interests of the EaP countries

a. The EU's limited commitment to the European integration of the EaP states has been visible since the beginning of this partnership project. The EU has always avoided offering a clear prospect of membership to the six EaP countries. Despite numerous political declarations of support from European leaders, neither of the six partners has received any firm guarantees or commitments with specific deadlines.

Since 2011, the parameters of EU involvement have been established. Despite the progress made, particularly by the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, the EU gave the impression of having political and geopolitical boundaries during the Warsaw Summit. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, a politician who will mark the next period of European policy, said: "We know that Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine had higher expectations from this summit: They wanted a clear prospect of joining the Union. However, there aren't enough circumstances to offer a distinct viewpoint. We wait until every requirement is satisfied before proceeding"¹⁴⁴.

In the new post-2014 context, it is clear that the mere reform of states, accompanied by the implementation of EU policies and acquis, is no longer sufficient to achieve European enlargement. The ENP, as it was thought, no longer corresponds to geopolitical realities. It is enough to recall that the ENP has long been seen as a kind of "antechamber" for the enlargement of the European Union. Forced to consider a complex set of factors, the EU does not want to risk, and cannot afford, promising accession to the EaP states. This reality is determined by the EU's external and internal contexts, including its geopolitical environment. The latter is also connected to the decline in enlargement momentum following the waves of accession in 2004, 2007, and 2013.

Many countries have become reluctant to further expand. The financial and economic crisis has undoubtedly contributed to this state, which has shifted the focus to domestic problems. The need for institutional reform but also the increasingly complicated geopolitical context (the conflict in Ukraine; the situation in the Middle East and North Africa; the refugee and migrant crisis; trade tensions; and paradigm shifts in U.S. foreign and security policy that marked Donald Trump's presidency) are able to further complicate this picture.

Last but not least, another vulnerability of the EU's common neighborhood policies, visible in the period after the Riga Summit, is given by the security dimension in the ENP approach. This proves to be insufficiently clear and unrelated to the current geopolitical

¹⁴³ See more Brie, Mircea (2022), *Eșecul actualului model al Parteneriatului Estic. De la complicatele interese naționale la contextualizarea geopolitică*, Ioan Bolovan, Melania-Gabriela Ciot (coord.), *Românii și România în context European. Istorie și diplomatie: Omagiu profesorului Vasile Pușcaș la împlinirea vârstei de 70 de ani*, Editura Academia Română, Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj-Napoca, p. 315-334.

¹⁴⁴ EaP Summit (2011), *Summitul Parteneriatului Estic: între așteptări și realitate*, <https://www.timpul.md/articol/summitul-parteneriatului-estic-intre-asteptari-si-realitate--27897.html>, accessed 04.12.2022



situation, the security thus proving to be a “weak point”¹⁴⁵, on the agenda of the European neighborhood¹⁴⁶. The beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 served as confirmation of the EaP's shortcomings and bottlenecks as well as the limitations of the guarantees that the EU could have provided to the EaP states¹⁴⁷.

b. The general geopolitical context, and particularly Russian opposition, have shaped EaP member states' policies. The brutal Russian interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (after 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, with the support of the separatists in the east, and primarily with the military invasion started on February 24, 2022) were associated with the total enslavement of Aleksandr Lukashenko's regime to Putin, but also the maintenance of a constantly tense atmosphere in Transnistria and especially in Nagorno-Karabakh. A simple analysis leads to the conclusion that states that did not accept the Russian Federation's political and geopolitical orientation were forced to confront internal and external challenges, often of a military nature, supported by the Russians. The invasion and war in Ukraine exemplify the Russian Federation's reaction to Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic orientation.

Russian aggression at all levels put pressure on the fragile European integration initiatives that had begun to emerge in the EaP states. The EU was unable to respond effectively using the mechanisms at its disposal.

c. The EaP states' specific national interests, which frequently diverge from European integration, have also contributed to the failure to achieve the original EaP objectives. The level of ambition for European integration varied across the six countries. Furthermore, some states have never even expressed an interest in this direction, with the EaP seen as a tool for pragmatic facilitation of economic gains without incorporating political implications. The EaP countries' national interests were not only divergent in relation to the goals of European integration, but also in many cases divergent in relation to the partnership's neighboring partners. The analysis of specific interests highlights the EaP countries' limited levels of ambition. Furthermore, by shifting the focus of the EaP from the multilateral to the bilateral dimension and on the more-for-more principle, the reform of the EaP highlights the flexibility of EU policies regarding the EaP in direct agreement with the constraints imposed by these national interests correlated to the specific geopolitical context.


The EaP Index 2020-2021 analysis performed on approximation dimension highlights the premises from which we started. Three EaP countries have made progress toward their high ambition level (Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia), while the other three have shown limited interest in achieving integrative goals.

¹⁴⁵ Gogolashvili, Kakha (2015), *Position Paper 4: Georgia*, in Felix Hett, Sara Kikić, Stephan Meuser (eds.), *Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Eastern Dimension*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, iunie 2015, p. 18, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/11483.pdf>, accesat în data de 28.02.2022

¹⁴⁶ Bărbulescu, I. Gh. (coord.), Brie, Mircea, Toderaş N. (2016), *Cooperarea transfrontalieră între România și Ucraina, respectiv între România și Republica Moldova. Oportunități și provocări între 2014-2020*, Tritonic, București, 9. 110-111

¹⁴⁷ Brie, Mircea (2017), *”Rethinking the European Neighborhood Policy. Eastern Partnership”*, in *Analele Universității din Oradea, Seria Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene*, p. 63-66

Figure 1. Approximation Dimension. The Eastern Partnership Index 2020-2021




Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the report EaP Index 2020-2021, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022

The overall results are also visible in the three sub-domains: Democracy and good Governance; Policy Convergence with the European Union; Sustainable Development.

The 2021 Index found Ukraine and Moldova to be the joint frontrunners, with Georgia in third position. The results mean that the Associated Trio hold the top three places based on aggregate scoring. Armenia scored well on indicators to do with democracy and good governance, but was less impressive with regards to policy convergence, thus it takes fourth place. Fifth and sixth places are taken by Belarus and Azerbaijan¹⁴⁸.

¹⁴⁸ Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, “What is EaP Index?”, available at: <https://eap-csf.eu/what-is-eap-index/>, accessed 04.12.2022.

Figure 2. Approximation Dimension (Categories). The Eastern Partnership Index 2020-2021



Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the report EaP Index 2020-2021, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022

The Republic of Moldova received an average of 0.70 points in the proximity dimension, with differences between the three subdomains: democracy and good governance (0.71 points); policy convergence with the European Union (0.80 points); and Sustainable Development (0.59 points). The Republic of Moldova received a maximum score of 1.00 in the following categories: transparent budget, judicial competences, institutional framework, border management, energy efficiency, and climate change. The category of judicial appointment, promotion, and dismissal received the most points (0.33 points)¹⁴⁹ (See more Appendix no. 1).

Ukraine achieved an average score of 0.70 points in the size of the approximation, with differences between the three subdomains: Democracy and Good Governance (0,69 points); Policy Convergence with the European Union (0,77 points); Sustainable Development (0,64 points). Ukraine achieved a maximum score of 1.00 points in the following categories: Legal Framework and its compliance with international standards; Access to Information; Irregular immigration, including readmission; Institutional framework; Energy Security. The least points were scored in the category: Corruption incidence and the capacity to criminalize and prosecute corruption (0,38 points); Appointment, promotion and dismissal of judges (0,17 points) and Employment and remuneration (0 points)¹⁵⁰. (See more Appendix no. 1).

Georgia achieved an average score of 0.65 points in the size of the approximation, with differences between the three subdomains: Democracy and Good Governance (0,70 points); Policy Convergence with the European Union (0,70 points); Sustainable Development (0,54

¹⁴⁹ Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, "EaP-Index Spreadsheet-2020-2021", available at: [EaP-Index Spreadsheet-2020-2021.xlsx \(live.com\)](https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/), accessed 04.12.2022

¹⁵⁰ *Ibidem*



points). Georgia scored a maximum score of 1.00 points in the following categories: Legislature's institutional capacity; Parliamentary oversight; Institutional framework; Irregular immigration, including readmission; Energy Security. The least points were scored in the category Appointment, promotion and dismissal of judges (0,33 points)¹⁵¹ (See more Appendix no. 1).

Armenia achieved an average score of 0.63 points in the size of the approximation, with differences between the three subdomains: Democracy and Good Governance (0,73 points); Policy Convergence with the European Union (0,64 points); Sustainable Development (0,51 points). Armenia achieved a maximum score of 1.00 points in the following categories: Transparent budgeting; Internal and external auditing; Irregular immigration, including readmission; Energy Security. The lowest points were obtained in the category: Management of public service quality (0,20 points); Employment and remuneration (0,00 points)¹⁵² (See more Appendix no. 1).

Belarus achieved an average score of 0.49 points in the size of the approximation, with differences between the three subdomains: Democracy and Good Governance (0,31 points); Policy Convergence with the European Union (0,48 points); Sustainable Development (0,67 points). Belarus achieved a maximum score of 1.00 points in the following categories: Energy efficiency; Employment and remuneration; Energy Security. The lowest points were obtained in the category: The Right to Freedom of Assembly (0,06 points); The Right to Freedom of Association (0,05 points); Conditions for opposition (0 points); Electoral Competitiveness (0,00 points)¹⁵³ (See more Appendix no. 1).

Azerbaijan achieved an average score of 0.44 points in the size of the approximation, with differences between the three subdomains: Democracy and Good Governance (0,35 points); Policy Convergence with the European Union (0,53 points); Sustainable Development (0,45 points). Azerbaijan scored a maximum score of 1.00 points in the following categories: Institutional framework; Energy Security. The fewest points were obtained in the category: Independent Media (0,04 points); Legal Framework and its compliance with international standards (0 points); Electoral Competitiveness (0,00 points); Employment and remuneration (0,00 points)¹⁵⁴ (See more Appendix no. 1).

4.2.3. The results of the Republic of Moldova: the EaP Index

Linkage Dimension. It includes elements like political dialogue, trade and economic integration, transportation and energy, freedom, security, and justice, as well as education, people-to-people exchanges, and humanitarian aid. We can see that the Republic of Moldova experienced a regression in 2014 before resuming their upward trend in 2015-2016. The increase was followed by a minor decrease.


¹⁵¹ *Ibidem*

¹⁵² *Ibidem*

¹⁵³ *Ibidem*

¹⁵⁴ *Ibidem*

Figure 3. Linkage Dimension– Republic of Moldova




Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the reports European Integration Index for EaP Countries 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and EaP Index 2015-2016, 2017, 2018-2019, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022

One defining category for the dimension of the link is political dialogue with the EU, which refers primarily to bilateral institutions, multilateral institutions, and the Eastern Partnership, as well as cooperation in foreign and security policy. It should be noted that, starting with 2015, the category of political dialog was merged with that of international security, political dialog, and cooperation, which had a negative impact on the RM's score. The decline in trend, which was also observed in the other EaP states, was influenced by regional security concerns that emerged in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. Last but not least, this can be interpreted as a consequence of the fact that in November 2016, Igor Dodon, the pro-Russian candidate in the presidential elections in the Republic of Moldova, won the elections in front of the pro-European candidate, Maia Sandu¹⁵⁵.

Without having data to quantify the EaP Index, we can state unequivocally that the political dialogue improved toward 2020, particularly after Maia Sandu was elected president and a clear pro-European policy that is supportive of EU integration was developed.

¹⁵⁵ Całus, K., 2016, „Igor Dodon has won the presidential election in Moldova”, Centre for Eastern Studies, disponibil la: <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-11-14/igor-dodon-has-won-presidential-election-moldova>, accesat în data de 04.12.2022


Figure 4. Political Dialogue with EU – Linkage Dimension



Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the reports European Integration Index for EaP Countries 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and EaP Index 2015-2016, 2017, 2018-2019, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022

The second category in the Linkage Dimension is that of **Trade and economic integration**, which since 2015 has been included in **Sectoral cooperation and trade flows**. This category examines the extent to which trade and investment in EaP countries are integrated into the EU. At the same time, the integration of energy sources/markets and the density of transport links is assessed separately, as these two sectors constitute crucial infrastructures for economic integration¹⁵⁶.

Figure 5. Trade and economic integration (2011-2014) / Sectoral cooperation and trade flows (2015-2019) – Linkage Dimension




Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the reports European Integration Index for EaP Countries 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and EaP Index 2015-2016, 2017, 2018-2019, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022

The results obtained in this category show the efforts made towards improving trade flows, removing barriers to trade in goods and boosting foreign direct investment. This category includes the following subcategories – Trade with EU: Commodities; Investments and Loans from EU; Trade with EU: Services; Trade Defence Instruments; Energy Interdependence;

¹⁵⁶ Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, “What is EaP Index?”, available at: <https://eap-csf.eu/what-is-eap-index/>, accessed 04.12.2022

Transport: Integration with Trans-European Networks; Environment. Performing the analysis of the results of the Republic of Moldova in the category of trade and economic integration in 2011-2019, we observe the following evolution – decrease (2012) – increase (2013) – stagnation (2014) – decrease (2015-2016) – increase (2017) – stagnation (2018-2019). In the period 2011-2016, Moldova occupied the 2nd place in this category, ceding to Ukraine, but in 2017 the situation changed and Moldova was on the 1st place. Even if Moldova occupied the first position in 2017 with the score – 0.70, this result was not a good one, considering that in 2011 the country had the score - 0.74¹⁵⁷.

Figure 6. Citizens in Europe – Linkage Dimension



Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the reports EaP Index 2015-2016, 2017, 2018-2019, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022

An important subcategory of indicators is grouped at the level of Linkage dimension after 2015 in **Citizens in Europe**. This includes the following indicators: Cultural Exchange and Co-operation; Affinity with European Union; Cooperation in science and education; Mobility, including academic and student mobility; Digital and Information Society. Some of these indicators were discovered in approximate forms between 2011 and 2014 (some of them in the Management Dimension).¹⁵⁸

Comparatively speaking, the Republic of Moldova's score is the highest of the EaP states in 2017 and comes in second place to Georgia in 2015-2016 and 2018-2019 (EaP-CSF, 2022a). The Republic of Moldova received the highest score in Mobility, including academic and student mobility (1.00 points), in 2017. The indicator of affinity with the European Union (0.93 points) was also improved. Surprisingly, this score was surpassed by Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, all of which had a maximum score of 1.00. The category of Cultural Exchange and Cooperation received the lowest rating (0.44 points)¹⁵⁹.

Management Dimension. It includes variables such as: the coordination mechanism; the legislative harmonization mechanism; the civil society participation and EU assistance management. An extremely important element in this analysis is that the management


¹⁵⁷ Goreainov, Victoria (2020), *The results of the Republic of Moldova within the Eastern Partnership in the Light of the - Eastern Partnership Index Study*, in *Analele Universității din Oradea, Seria Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene*, p. 96

¹⁵⁸ Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, “What is EaP Index?”, available at: <https://eap-csf.eu/what-is-eap-index/>, accessed 04.12.2022

¹⁵⁹ *Ibidem*

dimension has been integrated into the other dimensions since 2015, when the official name of the index was changed¹⁶⁰. This change of vision was also confirmed at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga where the emphasis was on differentiating partner states according to their interests (EU Council 2015), thus changing the vertically generalized view of the top-down type (e.g. from the EU to the EaP) towards a horizontally adaptable one between partners. It represents the evolution of management structures and policies in the Eastern Partnership countries, which aim at European integration in the EU.

Figure 7. Management Dimension – Republic of Moldova



Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the reports European Integration Index for EaP Countries 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022

”Initially in terms of Management, the Republic of Moldova had a good result, but in 2012 the situation suddenly changed to decrease, and in 2013-2014 the score began to increase, but it still did not reach the same indicator as in 2011. If in 2011 Moldova was placed second in this ranking, after Georgia, in 2012-2013, the country improved the score, placing first, but in 2014 Moldova lost to Georgia again”¹⁶¹.


In comparison to the six EaP states, it is interesting to note that this dimension initially maintains the same separation of a leading group in terms of mechanisms of coordination, legislative harmonization, civil society participation, and management of EU assistance (Republic of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine), but it records a detachment of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova from the rest of the partners for the last two analyzed time periods¹⁶². The reason for this detachment is mainly related to two of the defining categories for this dimension of the EaP Index: the coordination mechanism and the participation of civil society.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibidem*

¹⁶¹ Goreainov, Victoria (2020), *The results of the Republic of Moldova within the Eastern Partnership in the Light of the - Eastern Partnership Index Study*, in *Analele Universității din Oradea, Seria Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene*, p. 104

¹⁶² Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, “What is EaP Index?”, available at: <https://eap-csf.eu/what-is-eap-index/>, accessed 04.12.2022

Figure 7. Management Dimension (Categories) – Republic of Moldova



Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the reports European Integration Index for EaP Countries 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022


At the level of the examined subdomains, an asymmetric evolution distinct from the four major categories can be seen.

Approximation Dimension

In more detail, the 2011 pilot edition describes this dimension of harmonization using eight categories for which partner countries receive scores: Democracy; Rule of Law; Governance Quality; Market Economy; Freedom, security and justice; Energy and transport; Environment; Education and People to People. Since 2012, these categories have been reduced to 3, such as: Deep and Sustainable Democracy; Market Economy and DCFTA; Sectoral Approximation. At the same time, since 2015 the names of these categories have changed – Deep and Sustainable Democracy; EU Integration and Convergence; Sustainable Development.

By looking at the chronological chart for this dimension (period 2011-2021), we can see a demarcation point at the level of 2015, until the Republic of Moldova registered an upward trend. This trend came to an end in 2015, when the Republic of Moldova experienced a noticeable decline until 2017. We won't see a return to the upward trend until after the 2020 presidential election.

Figure 8. Approximation Dimension– Republic of Moldova



Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the reports European Integration Index for EaP Countries 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and EaP Index 2015-2016, 2017, 2020-2021, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022


In the period 2020-2021, the Republic of Moldova achieved an average score of 0.7 points. There are some elements of the specific under analytical relation at the level of the three main categories of subdomains¹⁶³ (See more Appendix no. 1):

- Democracy and Good Governance, with an average score of 0.71 points, it includes subcategories such as:
 - Democratic Rights and Elections, including Political Pluralism (0,71 points on average)
 - Human rights and Protection against Torture (0,86 points on average)
 - State Accountability (0,73 points on average)
 - Independent Media (0,55 points on average)
 - Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Assembly and Association (0,83 points on average)
 - Independent Judiciary (0,66 points on average)
 - Equal opportunities and non-discrimination (0,76 points on average)
 - Fight against corruption (0,65 points on average)
 - Public administration (0,68 points on average)
- Policy Convergence with the European Union, with an average score of 0.80 points, it includes subcategories such as:
 - Market Economy and DCFTA (0,66 points on average)
 - Freedom, Security and Justice (0,95 points on average)
 - Energy: Legislation Convergence and Energy Policy (0,83 points on average)
 - Environment and climate policy (0,94 points on average)
 - Transport: Regulatory Policy (0,61 points on average)
- Sustainable Development, with an average score of 0.80 points, it includes subcategories such as:
 - People (0,61 points on average)
 - Planet (0,64 points on average)

¹⁶³ Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, “EaP-Index Spreadsheet-2020-2021”, available at: [EaP-Index Spreadsheet-2020-2021.xlsx \(live.com\)](#), accessed 04.12.2022

- Prosperity (0,60 points on average)
- Peace and Partnership (0,61 points on average)


Figure 9. Deep and Sustainable Democracy (2011-2017) / Democracy and Good Governance (2020-2021) – Approximation Dimension



Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the reports European Integration Index for EaP Countries 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and EaP Index 2015-2016, 2017, 2020-2021, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022

The indicators quantified at the level of the first category of subdomains reflect the macrotrend: After 2014 (the year of Crimea's annexation), there has been a trend toward worsening democracy and good governance, as evidenced by the election of Igor Dodon as president in 2016.

Figure 10. EU Integration and Convergence – Approximation Dimension




Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the reports EaP Index 2015-2016, 2017, 2020-2021, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022

Given the three-fold change in the name of the subdomains (including the categories of indicators in composition), we have conducted, as we can see, an analysis of **EU Integration and Convergence / Policy Convergence** only for the period 2015-2021 when the same main structure was maintained. The main indicators that quantified the European integration and

convergence in the case of the Republic of Moldova recorded a progressive evolution, deepening and expanding at the integrative level.

We offer for example two of the five categories of indicators within the subdomain **EU Integration and Convergence**: Freedom, Security and Justice; Market Economy and DCFTA.


Figure 11. Freedom, Security and Justice – subcategorie EU Integration and Convergence/Policy Convergence (Approximation Dimension)



Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the reports European Integration Index for EaP Countries 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and EaP Index 2015-2016, 2017, 2020-2021, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022

Freedom, Security and Justice, it is one of five indicator categories within the **EU Integration and Convergence** subdomain, and is a component of the approximation dimension. The Republic of Moldova has demonstrated a high level of convergence by maintaining a relatively high score throughout the period.


Figure 12. Market Economy and DCFTA – subcategorie EU Integration and Convergence / Approximation Dimension



Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the reports European Integration Index for EaP Countries 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and EaP Index 2015-2016, 2017, 2020-2021, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022

Economic integration and the development of a market economy have seen clear progress in recent years. The best score on this sub-category of indicators was recorded in 2020-2021 (see more Appendix no. 1).

Figure 13. Environment and Sustainable Development (2011-2014) / Sustainable Development (2015-2021)– Approximation Dimension– Republic of Moldova



Source: author's own preparations based on data collected from the reports European Integration Index for EaP Countries 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and EaP Index 2015-2016, 2017, 2020-2021, available online <https://eap-csf.eu/eastern-partnership-index/>, accessed 14.12.2022

In recent years, one of the EU's stated priorities has been environmental protection and policies, specifically sustainable development. These indicator categories could not be used to evaluate the progress of the EaP states. After a relatively stable and positive evolution, with a peak in 2015-2016 (0.78 points), there was a drop to 0.57 points (2017) and 0.59 points in 2020-2021. "In the period 2011-2014, Moldova was placed on the first place in this ranking, in 2015-2016 on the second place, and in 2017 Moldova obtained a very low score, placing on the last place together with Georgia"¹⁶⁴.

4.2.4. Conclusions

Despite the Republic of Moldova's pendulatory and oscillating political evolution, as captured by the EaP Index analysis, we see a clear positive trend in the integrative process. Without being an irreversible process, democratization, convergence, and integration have begun to produce tangible benefits at the societal level. The political class is also becoming more aware of this reality. The EAP Index encapsulates the mechanisms of change brought on by closer ties to the EU and the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law. The development of a strong civil society and an independent media must still be anticipated. Although it is worn out, the process has started and is already producing some results.

¹⁶⁴ Goreainov, Victoria (2020), *The results of the Republic of Moldova within the Eastern Partnership in the Light of the - Eastern Partnership Index Study*, in *Analele Universității din Oradea, Seria Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene*, p. 103



The Republic of Moldova's society has become vulnerable as a result of the complicated geopolitical context created by the war in Ukraine. The prospect of military intervention in Transnistria jeopardizes the European integration process. Opportunities have also been created in this context. The European Union demonstrated its solidarity, including during Moldova's current energy crisis (at the end of 2022, Romania, but also other European states, responded promptly and consistently by providing electricity, gas, and financial assistance).

The resolution of the Ukrainian crisis will have an expected impact on the Republic of Moldova's European future. This process, however, depends to a greater extent on the resilience to the deep and yet unfinished crises that Moldovan society must prove.

Appendix no. 1. Approximation Dimension. The Eastern Partnership Index 2020-2021

		Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Georgia	Moldova	Ukraine
	TOTAL APPROXIMATION	0.63	0.44	0.49	0.65	0.70	0.70
1	DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE	0.73	0.35	0.31	0.70	0.71	0.69
1.1	Democratic Rights and Elections, including Political Pluralism	0.84	0.20	0.16	0.77	0.71	0.78
1.1.1	Legal Framework and its compliance with international standards	0.92	0.00	0.23	0.54	0.62	1.00
1.1.2	Organisation of elections	0.83	0.50	0.22	0.89	0.78	0.78
1.1.3	Electoral campaigning	0.71	0.29	0.18	0.71	0.53	0.41
1.1.4	Electoral Competitiveness	0.89	0.00	0.00	0.96	0.92	0.95
1.2	Human rights and Protection against Torture	0.82	0.49	0.15	0.69	0.84	0.91
1.2.1	International Protection of Human Rights	0.83	0.72	0.17	0.75	0.86	0.94
1.2.2	National Protection of Civil and Political Rights	0.81	0.25	0.13	0.63	0.81	0.88
1.3	State Accountability	0.75	0.41	0.47	0.88	0.73	0.86
1.3.1	Executive accountability to legislature	0.76	0.34	0.29	0.80	0.77	0.70
1.3.1.1	Legislature's influence over executive	0.82	0.53	0.27	0.85	0.78	0.83
1.3.1.2	Legislature's institutional autonomy	0.90	0.50	0.35	0.85	0.75	0.75
1.3.1.3	Legislature's specific powers	0.60	0.40	0.50	0.80	0.70	0.70
1.3.1.4	Legislature's institutional capacity	0.83	0.17	0.33	1.00	0.83	0.83
1.3.1.5	Conditions for opposition	0.63	0.11	0.00	0.48	0.77	0.36
1.3.2	Access to Information	0.57	0.14	0.71	0.93	0.57	1.00
1.3.3	Transparent budgeting	1.00	0.75	0.60	0.98	1.00	0.99
1.3.4	Democratic control over security and law enforcement institutions	0.66	0.40	0.26	0.83	0.59	0.76
1.3.4.1	Internal control	0.56	0.36	0.50	0.81	0.47	0.75
1.3.4.2	Parliamentary oversight	0.61	0.39	0.19	1.00	0.82	0.86
1.3.4.3	Transparency	0.74	0.50	0.23	0.85	0.52	0.83
1.3.4.4	Civil society oversight	0.71	0.35	0.14	0.67	0.53	0.61
1.4	Independent Media	0.67	0.04	0.20	0.59	0.55	0.54
1.5	Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Assembly and Association	0.84	0.29	0.09	0.64	0.83	0.66
1.5.1	Freedom of opinion and expression	0.83	0.25	0.17	0.58	0.75	0.50
1.5.2	The Right to Freedom of Assembly	0.83	0.33	0.06	0.44	0.89	0.67
1.5.3	The Right to Freedom of Association	0.86	0.29	0.05	0.88	0.86	0.81
1.6	Independent Judiciary	0.71	0.43	0.50	0.57	0.66	0.56
1.6.1	Appointment, promotion and dismissal of judges	0.50	0.17	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.17
1.6.2	Institutional independence	0.71	0.29	0.43	0.57	0.57	0.57
1.6.3	Judicial powers	0.75	0.50	0.63	0.88	1.00	0.75
1.6.4	Accountability and transparency	0.88	0.75	0.63	0.50	0.75	0.75
1.7	Equal opportunities and non-discrimination	0.47	0.29	0.21	0.67	0.76	0.67
1.7.1	International and regional HR legal documents	0.54	0.33	0.21	0.58	0.71	0.71

		Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Georgia	Moldova	Ukraine
1.7.2	Anti-discrimination legislation and policy	0.39	0.25	0.21	0.77	0.81	0.63
1.8	Fight against corruption	0.88	0.52	0.49	0.79	0.65	0.51
1.8.1	Corruption incidence and the capacity to criminalize and prosecute corruption	0.73	0.16	0.38	0.51	0.51	0.38
1.8.2	Internal and external auditing	1.00	0.60	0.40	0.90	0.65	0.40
1.8.3	Public procurement	0.90	0.80	0.70	0.95	0.80	0.75
1.9	Public administration	0.59	0.52	0.52	0.72	0.68	0.72
1.9.1	Policy formulation and co-ordination	0.64	0.31	0.54	0.69	0.62	0.67
1.9.2	Local government	0.75	0.64	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.79
1.9.3	Impartial and professional civil service	0.38	0.61	0.53	0.72	0.67	0.69
1.9.3.1	Legal framework of civil service management	0.82	0.77	0.64	0.86	0.91	0.91
1.9.3.2	Institutional framework	0.33	1.00	0.33	1.00	1.00	1.00
1.9.3.3	Employment and remuneration	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.00
1.9.3.4	Recruitment, promotion, and disciplinary procedures	0.56	0.50	0.26	0.82	0.56	0.76
1.9.3.5	Management of public service quality	0.20	0.80	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.80
2	POLICY CONVERGENCE	0.64	0.53	0.48	0.70	0.80	0.77
2.1	Market Economy and DCFTA	0.65	0.46	0.45	0.77	0.66	0.78
2.1.1	Market Economy	0.83	0.60	0.47	0.85	0.71	0.71
2.1.1.1	Market entry and exit	0.87	0.54	0.68	0.81	0.47	0.64
2.1.1.2	Competition policy and state aid	0.86	0.39	0.12	0.82	0.67	0.85
2.1.1.3	Private property	0.68	0.76	0.51	0.92	0.79	0.64
2.1.1.4	Intellectual property rights (IPRs)	0.90	0.71	0.56	0.85	0.90	0.72
2.1.2	Trade policy convergence	0.47	0.32	0.44	0.69	0.62	0.84
2.1.2.1	Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)	0.36	0.18	0.41	0.60	0.74	0.88
2.1.2.2	Sanitary and phytosanitary measures	0.42	0.23	0.40	0.65	0.48	0.85
2.1.2.3	Customs and trade facilitation	0.62	0.56	0.50	0.81	0.64	0.79
2.1.3	Sectoral cooperation	0.50	0.41	0.30	0.66	0.79	0.74
2.1.3.1	Financial services and movement of capital	0.55	0.41	0.43	0.62	0.81	0.79
2.1.3.2	Digital Services	0.44	0.39	0.17	0.69	0.78	0.69
2.2	Freedom, Security and Justice	0.73	0.60	0.50	0.94	0.95	0.90
2.2.1	Visa dialogue	0.75	0.50	0.17	0.92	0.92	0.92
2.2.2	Irregular immigration, including readmission	1.00	0.71	0.57	1.00	0.93	1.00
2.2.3	Border management	0.20	0.40	0.69	0.83	1.00	0.80
2.2.4	Security and combatting organised crime	0.95	0.78	0.58	1.00	0.95	0.90
2.3	Energy: Legislation Convergence and Energy Policy	0.59	0.51	0.58	0.44	0.83	0.74
2.3.1	Institutional framework of energy market	0.26	0.36	0.17	0.46	0.65	0.65
2.3.2	Energy efficiency	0.75	0.67	1.00	0.42	1.00	0.83
2.3.3	Renewable Energy	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.83	0.83	0.67
2.3.4	Energy Security	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
2.4	Environment and climate policy	0.60	0.61	0.40	0.71	0.94	0.74
2.4.1	Environmental policy	0.54	0.82	0.60	0.69	0.88	0.67
2.4.2	Climate Change	0.65	0.40	0.20	0.73	1.00	0.80



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IN THE **Western
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		Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Georgia	Moldova	Ukraine
2.5	Transport: Regulatory Policy	0.63	0.46	0.48	0.63	0.61	0.71
3	SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT	0.51	0.45	0.67	0.54	0.59	0.64
3.1	People	0.50	0.42	0.80	0.50	0.61	0.63
3.2	Planet	0.62	0.58	0.70	0.66	0.64	0.73
3.3	Prosperity	0.59	0.46	0.73	0.57	0.60	0.70
3.4	Peace and Partnership	0.33	0.33	0.46	0.43	0.51	0.51



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